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Abstract
How can mortgages be redesigned to reduce housing market volatility, consumption volatil-
ity, and default? How does mortgage design interact with monetary policy? We answer these
questions using a quantitative equilibrium life cycle model with aggregate shocks, long-term
mortgages, and an equilibrium housing market, focusing on designs that index payments to
monetary policy. Designs that raise mortgage payments in booms and lower them in recessions
do better than designs with fixed mortgage payments. The benefits are quantitatively substan-
tial: In a simulated crisis under a monetary regime in which the central bank lowers real interest
rates in a bust, house prices fall 2.24 percentage points less, 23 percent fewer households default,
and consumption falls by 0.79 percentage points less with ARMs relative to FRMs. Among de-
signs that reduce payments in a bust, we show that those that front-load the payment reductions
and concentrate them in recessions outperform designs that spread payment reductions over the
life of the mortgage. Front-loading alleviates household liquidity constraints in states where
they are most binding, reducing default and stimulating housing demand by new homeowners.
To isolate this channel, we compare an FRM with a built-in option to be converted to an ARM
with an FRM with an option to be refinanced at the prevailing FRM rate. Under these two
contracts, the present value of a lender’s loan falls by roughly an equal amount, but the FRM
that can be converted to an ARM, which front loads payment reductions, reduces the declines
in prices and consumption six times as much, and reduces default three times as much.
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1 Introduction
The design of mortgages is crucial to both household welfare and the macroeconomy. Home equity
is the largest component of wealth for most households, and mortgages tend to be their dominant
source of credit, so the design of mortgages has an outsized effect on household balance sheets
(Campbell, 2013). In the mid-2000s boom and subsequent bust, housing wealth extraction through
the mortgage market boosted consumption in the boom and reduced consumption in the bust (e.g.,
Mian and Sufi, 2011; Mian, Rao, and Sufi, 2013). Mortgage debt also led to the wave of foreclosures
that resulted in over six million households losing their homes, badly damaging household balance
sheets and crippling the housing market (e.g., Guren and McQuade, 2019; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi,
2015). Finally, in the wake of the recession, there has been increased attention paid to the role
that mortgages play in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy through household
balance sheets (e.g., Auclert, 2019; Wong, 2019; Di Maggio et al., 2017; Beraja et al., 2019).
In this paper, we study how to best design mortgages in order to reduce household consump-
tion volatility and default and to increase household welfare. There is considerable evidence that
implementation frictions prevent financial intermediaries from modifying mortgages ex post in a
crisis (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2017a; Agarwal et al., 2017b). As a result, a better-designed ex ante
contract can likely deliver significant welfare benefits (e.g., Campbell and Cocco, 2015; Piskorski
and Tchistyi, 2017; Greenwald, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2018; Piskorski and Seru, 2018).
We are further motivated by the evidence that not just the level of household mortgage debt (e.g.,
loan-to-value or payment-to-income ratio), but also the design of such debt and in particular the
time path of payments, can impact household outcomes including consumption and default. For
example, Fuster and Willen (2017) and Di Maggio et al. (2017) study cohorts of borrowers with
hybrid adjustable rate mortgages contracted in the years before the crisis. Exploiting heterogeneity
in the timing of monthly payment reductions as mortgages transitioned from initial fixed rates to
adjustable rates during the crisis, these papers show that downward resets resulted in substantially
lower defaults and increased consumption. Similarly, studies that exploit quasi-random variation in
housing market interventions in the Great Recession such as the Home Affordable Refinance Pro-
gram (HARP) (Agarwal et al., 2017b) and the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)
(Agarwal et al., 2017a; Ganong and Noel, 2019) have found that monthly payment reductions
significantly reduced default and increased consumption.
Such empirical evidence suggests that given the cyclicality of interest rates, indexing mortgage
payments to interest rates can improve household outcomes and welfare. We pursue this indexation
question systematically using a quantitative equilibrium model featuring heterogeneous households,
endogenous mortgage spreads, and endogenous house prices. In a crisis, default increases the supply
of homes on the market, further pushing down prices, which in turn generates more default. Using
this framework, we quantitatively assess a variety of questions related to mortgage design. How
would consumption, default, home prices, and household welfare change if we were to alter the
design of mortgages in the economy, particularly in a deep recession and housing bust like the one
experienced during the Great Recession? In an economy that transits between booms, recessions,
and crises, how well do different indexed mortgages perform? What is the most effective simple
form of indexation?
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Our main finding is that designs in which mortgage payments are higher in booms and lower
in recessions do better than designs with fixed mortgage payments for risk and insurance reasons.
Moreover, among such designs, the most effective ones front-load the payment reductions so that
they are concentrated during recessions rather than spread out over the life of the mortgage. Front-
loading payment relief smooths consumption and limits default for homeowners who are liquidity
constrained and stimulates new housing demand by constrained current renters. The reduction in
default and increase in demand helps short-circuit a price-default spiral. Consequently, the benefit
of different designs depends largely on how effectively they deliver immediate payment reductions
to highly constrained households.
Our model features overlapping generations of households subject to both idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks, making endogenous decisions over home purchases, borrowing, consumption,
refinancing, and costly default. We consider different relationships between the interest rate and
the exogenous aggregate state, reflecting alternative monetary policies. Competitive lenders set
spreads for each mortgage to break even in equilibrium, so lenders charge higher interest rates
when a mortgage design hurts their bottom line. We calibrate the lender stochastic discount factor
(SDF) to options data so that lenders charge more for contracts that cost them more in crisis
states. Equilibrium in the housing market implies that household decisions, mortgage spreads,
and the interest rate rule influence the equilibrium home price process. Household expectations
regarding equilibrium prices and mortgage rates feed back into household decisions, and we solve
this fixed-point problem in a rich quantitative model using computational methods based on Krusell
and Smith (1998).
A key aspect of our analysis is that mortgage design affects household default decisions and
hence home prices, which in equilibrium feeds back to household indebtedness. The quantitative
implications of our model depend on accurately representing the link between home prices and
default. Consequently, after calibrating our model to match standard moments, monetary policy
since the 1980s, and the empirical distributions of mortgage debt and assets, we evaluate its ability
to quantitatively capture the effect of payment reductions on default by simulating the Fuster and
Willen (2017) quasi-experiment in our model. The model does a good job matching their findings
quantitatively. Simulating quasi-experiments in our calibration procedure is an innovation that
ensures that our model accurately captures the effects of changes in LTVs and interest rates as we
alter mortgage design.
The calibrated model provides a laboratory to assess the benefits and costs of different mortgage
designs, shed light on the key economic channels through which they work, and provide magnitudes
for how much different designs may stabilize prices, default, and consumption in a crisis.1 Our
primary application is the impulse response to a housing crisis, although we also consider the
unconditional performance of different mortgages. We begin by comparing an economy with all
fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) against one with all adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). While ARMs
1As with any structural exercise, we have made modeling choices that trade off tractability and realism. It is
likely that the model leaves out some aspects of reality, such as non-pecuniary default spillovers, household behavior
that can generate momentum in home prices, investor behavior that can generate realistic movements in the term
premium, frictional conversion between the owner-occupied and renter-occupied stock, or refinancing inertia. Thus,
while our model fits many important moments of the data quite well, it misses on others, and as a result our analysis
should be seen as providing a sense of the magnitudes involved in different mortgage designs.
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and FRMs are not necessarily optimal contracts, they provide the simplest and starkest comparison
for us to analyze the benefits of indexation in a world where the cyclicality of interest rates is aligned
with the cyclicality of income and home prices. We find that in a counterfactual economy suffering a
crisis similar to the 2007-2009 recession with all ARMs instead of all FRMs, house prices fall by 2.24
percentage points less, 23 percent fewer households default, consumption falls by 0.79 percentage
points less. Young, liquidity constrained households benefit to an even greater extent, to the point
that they are willing to give up 4 percentage points more of their remaining lifetime consumption to
avoid a crisis under FRM than under ARM. Unconditional on a crisis, an economy with ARMs has
4.6% lower aggregate consumption volatility and 4.1% lower mean default rate than an economy
with FRMs. The household welfare benefit of switching from FRM to ARM – not conditional on a
crisis — is more modest at 0.12 percent of consumption.2 This number is relatively small because
most household consumption risk is idiosyncratic and we calibrate households to have a utility
function with coefficient of relative risk aversion of only three.
ARMs alleviate the impact of a crisis for three reasons. First, ARMs deliver larger payment
reductions to constrained homeowners due to front-loading. ARM rates fall significantly more
than FRM rates during the crisis because FRM rates are determined by the long end of the yield
curve, which falls by less due to expectations-hypothesis-type logic. With FRMs, the payment
relief is spread out over the remaining life of the mortgage, but with ARMs it is concentrated in
the crisis. We find this “yield curve channel” to be quantitatively the most important way in which
ARMs stabilize a housing crisis. Second, ARMs automatically pass interest rate reductions through
to households. By contrast, FRMs only pass-through rate reductions when households refinance,
which is not possible for households that, due to the fall in house prices, have insufficient equity to
satisfy the LTV constraint. Therefore, underwater homeowners who are most at risk of default and
in need of liquidity relief are unable to receive any. Since ARMs provide greater hedging benefits
against declining labor income during the crisis, there is less default by underwater homeowners
which short-circuits the equilibrium price-default spiral and leads to a less-severe housing crisis. We
find the improved passthrough of interest rate reductions to underwater households under ARM
to be a quantitatively smaller channel than the yield curve channel. Third and finally, because
ARM rates fall more than FRM rates, ARMs are more effective at stimulating housing demand by
constrained renters in the crisis, which further limits price declines and the price-default spiral.
One issue with a pure ARM is that in an inflationary episode, real interest rates can spike up
while real income falls, with potentially catastrophic consequences. We consequently consider a new
mortgage design that partially protects against this scenario: A fixed rate mortgage with a one-
time option to convert to an adjustable rate mortgage, as suggested by Eberly and Krishnamurthy
(2014). Of course, borrowers pay for the prepayment option with a higher average loan rate, which
is offset somewhat by banks anticipating fewer defaults and losses in a crisis. Despite this cost, this
“EK convertible” mortgage delivers much better outcomes than a standard fixed rate mortgage in
2Throughout we use a welfare metric based on households’ consumption. In the model, lenders break even subject
to a calibrated SDF. Different mortgage designs leave lender utility unchanged, under this fixed SDF. The model
leaves out the possibility that mortgage designs may alter the SDF, e.g, which would happen if the SDF was based on
the equilibrium consumption stream of lenders, as in Campbell, Clara, and Cocco (2019). We do report the present
value of losses to lenders over a crisis (using their SDF), and our mortgage pricing condition ensures they break even
on average (again subject to their SDF).
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a “typical” crisis, realizing the vast majority of the benefits of the all-ARM economy when rates fall
in a downturn.At the same time, the EK mortgage significantly outperforms the standard ARM in
an inflationary episode in which rates rise during a housing bust.
We also consider a “FRM with an underwater refinancing option” (FRMUR) in which house-
holds with a fixed-rate mortgage have an option to refinance in a crisis into another fixed-rate
mortgage with equal principal regardless of their loan-to-value ratio. This is motivated by the fact
that lower long rates were not passed through to underwater households, which also motivated
the government’s HARP program. While the FRMUR does help these households, it does so by
relatively little because the long end of the yield curve does not fall by much, and so the payment
relief provided by the FRMUR is limited. Indeed, the gains in price, consumption, and default
stability are small relative to the EK convertible mortgage. This is the case despite the fact that
the decline in the present value of the bank’s mortgage portfolio when the crisis hits is similar under
these two designs.
The comparison of the EK convertible mortgage with the FRM with an option to be refinanced
underwater provides the sharpest example of our central finding that the best designs are those
that deliver immediate payment relief to liquidity constrained households rather than spreading
the relief over the entire term of the mortgage. Consistent with this, we show that an option ARM
design, which allows households to negatively amortize the mortgage up to a cap when liquidity
needs arise at a cost of higher payments in the future, delivers higher prices and consumption – but
more default – than both EK and ARM. Unlike those designs, the option ARM allows borrowers to
defer payments as a function of her idiosyncratic state. Our analysis quantifies the benefits of such
insurance in the mortgage contract, although we do not model the adverse selection it can induce.
Our analysis also calls attention to an important externality. When deciding their personal debt
position, households do not internalize the impact of their debt choice and liquid asset position on
macro fragility. This has important consequences in our model. For instance, ARMs provide more
relief relative to FRMs if they are introduced at the moment the crisis occurs rather than ex ante.
This is the case because homeowners expect the central bank to provide insurance by reducing
short rates in the ARM economy and take on more risk by levering up more and holding less liquid
savings, undoing some of the insurance benefit. Similarly, the insurance benefits of an option ARM
(OARM) design encourage households to take on more leverage risk ex ante, which creates a more
fragile pre-crisis LTV distribution than would otherwise be the case and higher default. These
results highlight that policy makers must account for the fact that households do not share their
macro-prudential concerns and may take on too much debt when insurance is offered.
Finally, we find that monetary policy and mortgage design should not be studied in isolation.
Indeed, monetary policy efficacy depends on mortgage design, and mortgage design efficacy de-
pends on monetary policy. We highlight this interaction by considering the performance of various
mortgage designs under alternate monetary policies. In particular, we allow monetary policy to
directly impact term premia. The most prominent example of this is unconventional monetary
policy, such as the Fed’s quantitative easing (QE) purchases of mortgage-backed securities to lower
long-term mortgage rates when the short rate constrained by the zero lower bound. Our analysis
of term premia can also shed light on the case where term premia are highly sensitive to changes in
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the short rate, which is suggested by some empirical evidence (e.g., Hanson and Stein, 2015) but
absent in our baseline model. We show that mortgage designs tied to the long rate such as FRM
and FRMUR are most effective in this case when monetary policy is able to impact the term pre-
mia. This result also implies that ex-post policies such as HARP need to be combined with policies
targeting the term premium, such as QE, in order to be maximally effective. This highlights the
importance of studying mortgage design and monetary policy jointly.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the relationship to the
existing literature. Section 3 presents our model, and Section 4 describes our calibration procedure.
Section 5 compares the performance of ARM-only and FRM-only economies to develop economic
intuition. Section 6 compares more exotic mortgage designs that combine beneficial features of
both FRMs and ARMs, and Section 7 considers the interaction of mortgage design with monetary
policy. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is most closely related to papers that analyze the role of mortgages in the macroecon-
omy through the lens of a heterogeneous agents model. In several such papers, house prices are
exogenous. Campbell and Cocco (2015) develop a life-cycle model in which households can borrow
using long-term fixed- or adjustable-rate mortgages and face income, house price, inflation, and
interest rate risk. They use their framework to study mortgage choice and the decision to default.
In their model, households can choose to pay down their mortgage, refinance, move, or default,
and mortgage premia are determined in equilibrium through a lender zero-profit condition. Our
modeling of households shares many structural features with this paper, but while they take house
prices as an exogenous process, we crucially allow for aggregate shocks and determine equilibrium
house prices. This critical feature of our model allows us to study the interaction of mortgage
design with endogenous price-default spirals. A prior paper, Campbell and Cocco (2003), uses a
more rudimentary model without default and with exogenous prices to compare ARMs and FRMs
and assess which households benefit most from each design. Similarly, Corbae and Quintin (2015)
present a heterogeneous agents model in which mortgages are priced in equilibrium and households
select from a set of mortgages with different payment-to-income requirements, but again take house
prices as exogenous. They use their model to study the role of leverage in triggering the foreclo-
sure crisis, placing particular emphasis on the differential wealth levels and default propensities
of households that enter the housing market when lending standards are relaxed. Conversely, we
focus on the impact of mortgage design and monetary policy on housing downturns, allowing for
endogenous house price responses.
Other heterogeneous agent models of the housing market have endogenous house prices but lack
aggregate shocks or rich mortgage designs. Kung (2015) develops a heterogeneous agents model
of the housing market in which house prices are determined in equilibrium. His model, however,
lacks aggregate shocks and household saving decisions. He focuses specifically on the equilibrium
effects of the disappearance of non-agency mortgages during the crisis. By contrast, we include
aggregate shocks and a rich set of household decisions that Kung assumes away. We also study
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a variety of mortgage designs and analyze how mortgage design interacts with monetary policy.
Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2019) present a life-cycle model with default, refinancing, and
moving in the presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks in which house prices are determined
in equilibrium. Their focus, however, is on explaining what types of shocks can explain the joint
dynamics of house prices and consumption in the Great Recession. They simplify many features of
the mortgage contract for tractability in order to focus on these issues, while our paper simplifies
the shocks and consumption decision in order to provide a richer analysis of mortgage design.3
Our paper also builds on a largely theoretical literature studying optimal mortgage design.
These papers identify important trade-offs inherent in optimal mortgage design in a partial equi-
librium settings. Concurrent research by Piskorski and Tchistyi (2017) studies mortgage design in
a setting with equilibrium house prices and asymmetric information in a two-period model. The
intuition they develop about the insurance benefits of state contingent contracts is complementary
to our own, which is is more focused on the timing of payments over the life of the loan. Concur-
rent research by Greenwald, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2018) studies shared appreciation
mortgages (SAMs) that index payments to aggregate house prices in a model with a fragile financial
sector. They show that the losses incurred by banks in a deep recession quantitatively outweigh
the benefits to household balance sheets under a SAM. Our papers are highly complementary. We
highlight the benefits of front-loading payment relief in mortgage designs that shift risk from house-
holds to financial intermediaries to a much more limited degree than a SAM, while GLVN study
whether such risk shifting would be beneficial. Indeed, we have experimented with SAMs in our
framework and found that the losses that banks incur in a crisis are an order of magnitude larger
than in the designs we consider. Finally, concurrent work Campbell, Clara, and Cocco (2018) uses
a model similar to the one we study but with exogenous house prices and an endogenous lender
SDF to study mortgage design. By contrast, our house prices are endogenous but our lender SDF
is exogenously calibrated. We see our papers as complementary but with different emphases: We
focus on the front-loading of payments and put greater emphasis on crisis episodes while CCC focus
on the covariance of payment reductions with lender consumption.
Beyond these three closely-related papers, Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010; 2011) consider mortgage
design from an optimal contracting perspective, finding that the optimal mortgage looks like an
option ARM when interest rates are stochastic and a subprime loan when house prices are stochastic.
Brueckner and Lee (2017) focus on optimal risk sharing in the mortgage market. Our paper is also
related to a literature advocating certain macroprudential polices aimed at ameliorating the severity
of housing crises. Mian and Sufi (2015) advocate for modifications through principal reduction,
while Eberly and Krishnamurthy (2014) advocate for monthly payment reductions. Greenwald
(2019) advocates for payment-to-income constraints as a macroprudential policy to reduce house
price volatility.
To calibrate our model, we draw on a set of papers which document empirical facts regarding
household leverage and default behavior. Foote et al. (2008) provide evidence for a “double
trigger” theory of mortgage default, whereby most default is accounted for by a combination of
3For instance, Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2019) assume that all mortgages have a single interest rate and
that lenders break even by charging differential up front fees. By contrast, we maintain each borrower’s interest rate
and contract choice as a state variable.
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negative equity and an income shock as is the case in our model. Bhutta et al. (2010), Elul et
al. (2010), and Gerardi et al. (2013) provide further support for illiquidity as the driving source
of household default. Fuster and Willen (2017) and Di Maggio et al. (2017) show that downward
rate resets lead to reductions in default and increases in household consumption, respectively.
Agarwal et al. (2017b), Agarwal et al. (2017a), and Ganong and Noel (2019) study the HAMP
and HARP programs and find similarly large effects of payment on default and consumption and
limited effects of principal reduction for severely-underwater households, which they relate to the
immediate benefits of payment relief versus the delayed benefits of principal reduction. This micro
evidence motivates our focus on mortgage designs with state-contingent payments, and we use
Fuster and Willen’s evidence to evaluate the quantitative performance of our model.
Finally, our research studies how mortgage design interacts with monetary policy and thus
relates to a literature examining the transmission of monetary policy through the housing market.
Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) posit that in depressed housing markets where many borrowers
owe more than their house is worth, monetary policy is less potent because individuals cannot
refinance. Beraja, Fuster, Hurst, and Vavra (2019) provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis
by analyzing the impact of monetary policy during the Great Recession and study the interaction
of monetary policy with mortgage design. Relatedly, a set of papers have argued that adjustable-
rate mortgages allow for stronger transmission of monetary policy since rate changes directly affect
household balance sheets (Calza et al., 2013; Auclert, 2019; Cloyne et al., 2019). Garriga et al.
(2016) provide a model with long-term debt that features a yield curve and is related to our findings
about the differential effects of mortgage designs that are priced off the short end relative to the
long end of the yield curve. Di Maggio et al. (2017) show empirically that the pass-through of
monetary policy to consumption is stronger in regions with more adjustable rate mortgages. Finally,
Wong (2019) highlights the role that refinancing by young households plays in the transmission of
monetary policy to consumption.
3 Model
This section presents an equilibrium model of the housing market that we subsequently use as a
laboratory to study different mortgage designs. Home prices and mortgage spreads are determined
in equilibrium. Short-term interest rates, on the other hand, are exogenous to the model and depend
on the aggregate state of the economy, reflecting an exogenous monetary policy rule. For ease of
exposition, we present the model for the case of an all-FRM economy or an all-ARM economy, but
consider other designs when presenting our quantitative results.
3.1 Setup
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The economy consists of a unit mass of overlapping generations
of heterogeneous households of age a = 1, 2, ..., T who make consumption, housing, borrowing,
refinancing and default decisions over their lifetime. Household decisions depend both on aggregate
state variables Σt and agent-specific state variables s
j
t , where j indexes agents. Unless otherwise
stated, all variables are agent-specific, and to simplify notation, we suppress their dependency on
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sjt .
The driving shock process in the economy is Θt, which is part of Σt. Θt follows a discrete Markov
process over five states Θt ∈{Crisis With Tight Credit, Recession With Tight Credit, Recession
With Loose Credit, Expansion With Tight Credit, Expansion With Loose Credit}. Θt is governed
by a transition matrix ΞΘ described subsequently.
Each generation lives for T periods. At the beginning of a period, a new generation is born and
shocks are realized. Agents then make decisions, and the housing market clears. Utility is realized
and the final generation dies at the end of the period. Households enter period t with a state sjt−1
and choose next period’s state variables sjt in period t given the period t housing price pt. Utility
is based on period t choices, and the short rate rt realized at time t is the interest rate between t
and t+ 1.
Households receive flow utility from housing Ht and non-durable consumption Ct:
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whereHT = 0 because the terminal generation must sell.
5 For simplicity, we assume that households
use their wealth to finance housing and end-of-life care after their terminal period. Consequently,
the wealth b is not distributed to incoming generations, who begin life with no assets.6
Households receive an exogenous income stream Yt:
Yt ≡ exp
(





Log income is the sum of an aggregate component that is common across households and a
household-specific idiosyncratic component. The aggregate component yaggt is a function of the
aggregate state Θt. The idiosyncratic component y
id




with transition matrix Ξid (Θt).
Households retire at age R < T . After retirement, households no longer face idiosyncratic
income risk and keep the same idiosyncratic income they had at age R, reduced by ρ log points
to account for the decline in income in retirement. This can be thought of as a social security
benefit that conditions on terminal income rather than average lifetime income for computational
tractability, as in Guvenen and Smith (2014).
4The term αa describes the utility from homeownership as a function of age. In our calibration, we will assume
that αa is decreasing in age so as to reflect the fact that at older ages the homeownership rate declines slightly.
5Including terminal wealth in the utility function is standard in OLG models of the housing market because
otherwise households would consume their housing wealth before death. In the data, however, the elderly have
substantial housing wealth which they do not consume. The functional form for the utility derived from terminal
wealth is standard.
6We make this assumption for computational simplicity. In practice, few people receive significant bequests.
Consequently, distributing bequests to younger generations would not significantly alter the distribution of wealth or
our results.
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There is a progressive tax system so that individuals’ net-of-tax income is Yt − τ (Yt). The tax
system is modeled as in Heathcote et al. (2017) so that:
τ (Yt) = Yt − τ0Y 1−τ1t .
Houses in the model are of one size, and agents can either own a house (Ht = 1) or rent a house
(Ht = 0).
7 There is a fixed supply of housing and no construction implying that the homeownership
rate is constant.8 Buying a house at time t costs pt, and owners must pay a per-period maintenance
cost of mpt. With probability ζ, homeowners experience a life event that makes them lose their
match with their house and list it for sale, while with probability 1− ζ, owners are able to remain
in their house.
The rental housing stock is entirely separate from the owner-occupied housing stock. Rental
housing can be produced and destroyed at a variable cost q, so in equilibrium renting costs q
per period. Although this assumption is stark, it is meant to capture that while there is some
limited conversion of owner-occupied homes to rental homes and vice-versa in practice, the rental
and owner-occupied markets are quite segmented (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2009; Halket et al., 2015;
Greenwald and Guren, 2019).9 This assumption implies that movements in house prices are ac-
companied by movements in the price-to-rent ratio, as is the case in the data.
A household’s end of period t mortgage balance is Mt ≥ 0 and carries interest rate it. We make
a timing assumption that the interest paid at date t is itMt, so that households pay their interest
between periods t and t+ 1 in advance at time t. With an annual calibration, this implies that the
realization of interest rates immediately impacts payments for both an adjustable- and fixed-rate
mortgage. An alternative timing convention would be to incur the payment of itMt at date t+ 1,
which would imply that interest rate changes would affect FRMs a year after ARMs. In practice,
mortgage payments are monthly and homeowners make decisions at an even higher frequency, so
that our up-front payment timing is a better representation of reality within our model and puts
ARMs and FRMs on equal footing. We assume that all debt in our model has this same timing
7We assume that houses are one size to maintain a computationally tractable state space in an environment with
rich mortgage design. In practice, the average house size does grow over the life cycle with age (see e.g., Li and Yao,
2007) and house size grows with income. Assuming one house size leads richer agents in our economy to have more
liquid assets and lower LTVs than in the data. This is not problematic for our calibration as the marginal agents for
purchasing and default are poorer.
8We assume a fixed housing supply to keep the model tractable given the lags required to realistically model
construction. Adding a construction response would dampen a boom but would not dramatically affect busts given
the durability of housing (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).
9To maintain tractability, heterogeneous agent models of the type we consider here typically make the assumption
of a perfectly segmented rental market or the polar opposite assumption of no segmentation and perfect arbitrage
between own and rent (e.g., Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante, 2019). Greenwald and Guren (2019) analyze the impor-
tance of these assumptions. They show that perfect segmentation implies that changes in credit conditions – such
as the tightening LTV constraint we use to start the crisis – will affect aggregate demand for housing and prices.
Similarly, foreclosures will affect house prices. By contrast, with perfect arbitrage between renting and owning, credit
conditions and foreclosure will change the homeownership rate but not house prices, which are pinned down by the
present value of rents for landlords. Guren and Greenwald calibrate a model that can nest these extreme cases
to match their micro evidence and find that in practice there is significant segmentation between owner-occupied
and rental markets, which we see as supportive of our stark assumption. Nonetheless, adding a realistic amount of
rental conversion would somewhat reduce the size of the equilibrium effects that foreclosures have on price and the
price-foreclosure spiral at the heart of our model.
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convention, and when we calibrate our model we convert interest rates to be consistent with the
timing in our model.10
Mortgage interest is tax deductible, so that taxes are τ (max {Yt − itMt, 0}). In order to econ-
omize on state variables, the mortgage amortizes over its remaining life as in Campbell and Cocco
(2003, 2015). This rules out mortgage designs with variable term lengths, but still allows for the
analysis of mortgage designs that rely on state-dependent payments. The appendix shows that the









(1 + it1−it )
T−a+1 − 1
. (1)
For an FRM, the household keeps the same interest rate it determined at origination i
FRM
t (Θt),
which is the same for all borrowers who originate in aggregate state Θt and determined competitively




where χARMt (Θt) is a spread over the short rate that borrowers keep over the life of their loan, also
determined at origination and dependent on origination state Θt.
11 This will also be the same for
all borrowers in a given aggregate state Θt and determined competitively as described below. The
short interest rate rt (Θt) is a function of the exogenous and stochastic aggregate state Θt.
At origination, mortgages must satisfy a loan to value constraint:
Mt (a) ≤ φtpt, (2)
where φt parameterizes the maximum loan-to-value ratio. Mortgages are non-recourse but default-
ing carries a utility penalty of d which is drawn each period i.i.d. from a uniform distribution over
[da, db].
12 Defaulting households lose their house today and cannot buy a new house in the period
of default due to damaged credit. The default goes on their credit record, and they are unable to
purchase until the default flag is stochastically removed.
Each period, homeowners can take one of four actions in the housing market: take no action
with regards to their mortgage and make at least the minimum mortgage payment (N), refinance
but stay in their current house (R), move to a new house and take out a new mortgage (M), or
default (D). Note that if a household refinances or moves to a new house, they must take out an
entirely new mortgage which is subject to the LTV constraint in equation (2). Moving has a cost
of km + cmpt for both buying and selling, while refinancing has a cost of kr + crMt.
Homeowners occasionally receive a moving shock that forces them to move with probability ζ.
10In particular, the interest rate it is a “pre-paid” interest rate (interest from t to t + 1 paid at t), whereas the
interest rate rt and most interest rates observed in the data are “post-paid” interest rates (interest from t to t+1 paid
at t+ 1). We convert post-paid interest rates rt to pre-paid interest rates it using it =
rt
1+rt
or back using rt =
it
1−it .
11When we refer to an ARM in this paper, we refer to a fully-adjustable-rate mortgage that adjusts every year.
In many countries, hybrid ARMs that have several years of a fixed interest rate and float thereafter are known as
“adjustable rate.” Aside from replicating the Fuster-Willen quasi-experiment in evaluating our calibration, we do
not consider hybrid ARMs to maintain a tractable state space.
12The assumption that d is drawn from a distribution rather than a single value helps smooth out the value functions
in the numerical implementation, but is not crucial for our results. In practice, da and db are close and the model is
essentially a single default cost model.
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In this case, they cannot remain in their current house and either move or default, while agents who
do not receive the moving shock are assumed to remain in their house and can either do nothing,
refinance, or default. Households reaching the end of life must sell. Regardless of whether they
receive a moving shock ζ, renters can either do nothing and pay their rent (N) or move into an
owner-occupied house (M) each period.
3.2 Decisions and Value Functions
Consider a household at time t that enters the period with owned housing Ht−1 ∈ {0, 1}, a mortgage
with principal balance Mt−1, and St−1 ≥ 0 in liquid savings. The household may also have a
default flag on its credit record Dt−1 = {0, 1}. The state of the economy at time t, Θt, is realized.





t−1 , Yt, Dt−1, at
}
, a vector of the household’s assets, liabilities, income,
credit record default status, interest rate for an FRM (or spread χt−1 for an ARM), and age. The
vector of aggregate state variables Σt includes the state of the economy Θt, and Ωt(s
j
t−1), the
cumulative distribution of individual states sjt−1 in the population. The home price pt is a function
of Σt.
The household faces two constraints. The first is a flow budget constraint:
Yt − τ (Yt − itMt) + St−1 + (1− it)Mt = Ct +
St
1 + rt
+Mt−1 + pt (Ht −Ht−1) (3)
+ q1 [Ht = 0] +mpt1 [Ht = 1] +K (Action) ,
where K (Action) is the fixed or variable cost of the action the household takes. The left hand
side of this expression is the sum of net-of-tax income, liquidated savings, and new borrowings.
The right hand side is the sum of consumption, savings for the next period, payments on existing
mortgage debt, net expenditures on owner-occupied housing, rental or maintenance costs, and the
fixed and variable costs of the action that the household takes.
The second constraint addresses the evolution of a household’s mortgage. Given a mortgage
balance Mt, implicitly define ∆Mt as the change in the mortgage balance over and above the
minimum payment:







(1 + it1−it )
T−a+1 − 1
−Mtit (4)
If ∆Mt is positive, the mortgage balance has risen relative to the minimum payment and the
homeowner has extracted equity, and if ∆Mt is negative the mortgage balance has prepaid. Thus,
households that do not move, refinance, or default face a constraint of ∆Mt ≤ 0. If a household
moves, it pays off its mortgage balance and chooses a new mortgage balance Mt, subject to the
LTV constraint (2). Finally, a household may also choose to default, in which case it loses its house
today and cannot buy, so Mt = Ht = 0. The household also receives a default on its credit record
so Dt = 1 and cannot buy again until its credit record is cleared, which occurs each period with
probability λ.
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as the value function for a




















































if Ht−1 = 0 and Dt−1 = 1.
On the top line, if the household receives the moving shock with probability ζ, it must decide
whether to default on the existing mortgage and be forced to rent, or pay off the mortgage balance,
in which case it can freely decide whether to rent or finance the purchase of a new home. On
the second line, if the household does not receive the moving shock, it decides between defaulting,
refinancing, or paying the minimum mortgage balance.13 Finally, in the last two lines, a household
that currently has no housing (currently a renter or just born) and does not have a default on their
credit record can decide whether to purchase a house and take on a new mortgage or continue to
rent. Renters with a default on their credit records Dt = 1 cannot purchase.
We next define the value functions under each of the actions A = {N,R,M,D}. Households

















it = it−1 for FRM, χt = χt−1 for ARM
∆Mt < 0.
Households who refinance make the same choices, but pay the fixed and variable costs of refinancing
(which can be rolled into their new mortgage) and face the LTV constraint rather than the ∆Mt < 0
13Our model assumes that household refinance optimally. However, there is an empirical literature shows that
there is significant inattention to refinancing (e.g., Keys, Pope and Pope (2016), Johnson, Meier, and Toubia (2019),
and Andersen et al. (2018)). This literature implies that contracts that automatically index payments to the state
of the economy, such as an ARM, are even more welfare enhancing relative to contracts that require a refinancing,
such as FRM, than our model indicates.
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t for FRM, χt = χ
ARM
t for ARM.
Households who move choose their consumption, savings, and if buying, mortgage balance, as
















Mt ≤ φpt if Ht+1 = 1,
it = i
FRM
t for FRM, χt = χ
ARM
t for ARM.
Households who default lose their home but not their savings. The defaulting households choose
















Ht = Mt = 0
Dt = 1.
In the final period, a household must liquidate its house regardless of whether it gets a moving
















3.3 Mortgage Spread Determination
We assume that mortgages are supplied by competitive lenders who discount payoffs using a stochas-
tic discount factor (SDF) mt,t+1, which is a function of today’s aggregate state Θt and tomorrow’s
state Θt+1. We do not endogenize the lender SDF but instead calibrate it using options market
data in Section 4.14 Importantly, our calibration sets high state prices for crisis states so that
lenders charge for the insurance implicit in the different mortgage designs we consider.
Define the net present value of the expected payments made by an age a household with id-
iosyncratic state sjt−1 and aggregate state Σt, which is the value of the mortgage to a lender, as












































is an indicator for whether a household defaults. In the event of
default, the lender forecloses on the home, sells it in the open market, and recovers a fraction Υ of
its current value. In the present period, the lender receives the recovered value in the event of a
foreclosure, the mortgage principal plus interest in the event the loan is paid off, and the required
payment on the mortgage plus any prepayments made by the borrower if the loan continues. The
lender also gets the discounted expected continuation value of the loan at the new balance if the
loan continues and discounts according to the SDF mt,t+1.
We assume that the interest rate on an FRM originated at time t, iFRMt , and the spread over
the short rate on an ARM originated at time t, χARMt , are determined competitively such that












= 0 ∀ Θi ∈ Θ, (6)
where Ωorigt is the distribution of newly originated mortgages at time t. The expectation integrates
out over all periods in which Θt takes on a given value Θi and over all loans originated at time
t.15 This pools risk across borrowers but prices the mortgage to incorporate all information on
the aggregate state of the economy, Θi. By allowing the pricing to depend on the aggregate state,
we allow mortgage rates to depend on the interest rate in that state as well as the expected
path of interest rates conditional on that state. We also allow pricing to depend on the endogenous
prepayment risk and default risk of mortgages as originated in a given state. Thus, our assumptions
imply that if a mortgage design shifts risks from borrowers to lenders in a given state, the spread
rises until the lenders are compensated for this risk.
Our assumption of a single spread for each aggregate state implies that there is cross-subsidization
in mortgage pricing. Because default is low on average in equilibrium, the amount of cross-
subsidization is not substantial.16 Moreover, in practice, there is cross-subsidization in GSE mort-
gage pricing: Hurst et al. (2016) document that GSE mortgage rates for otherwise identical loans
do not vary spatially.
15Mt is the end of period mortgage balance. Given the timing, the household immediately makes a mortgage
payment if itMt, and so on net the bank gives the household (1− it)Mt.
16Banks would make large losses on low-income homeowners who cannot afford their mortgage payment. However,
such households cannot make a down payment and cannot afford the fixed and variable costs of home purchase and
thus do not purchase in equilibrium. Those homeowners that do obtain mortgages do vary in their default risk, but
it is generally low.
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3.4 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of decision rules over actions A = {N,R,M,D} and state
variables Ct, St, Mt, Ht, a price function p(Σt), an FRM rate i
FRM (Θ) or an ARM spread χARM (Θ)
for each aggregate state Θ, and a law of motion for the aggregate state variable Σt. Decisions are
optimal given the home price function and the law of motion for the state variable. At these
decisions, the housing market clears at price pt, the risk-neutral lenders break even on average
according to (6), and the law of motion for Σt is verified.
Given the fixed supply of homes, market clearing equates supply from movers, defaulters, and



















housing. The housing market clearing condition satisfied by the pricing































where the first line side is supply which includes defaulted homes and sales and the second line is
demand.
3.5 Solution Method
Solving the model requires that households correctly forecast the law of motion for Σt which drives
the evolution of home prices. Note that Σt is an infinite-dimensional object due to the distribution
Ωt(s
j
t−1). To deal with this issue, we follow the implementation of the Krusell and Smith (1998)
algorithm in Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2019). We focus directly on the law of motion for
home prices and assume that households use a simple AR(1) forecast rule that conditions on the
state of the business cycle today Θt and the realization of the state of the business cycle tomorrow
Θt+1 for the evolution of pt:
log pt+1 = f(Θt,Θt+1) (log pt) (8)
where f(Θt,Θt+1) is a function for each realization of (Θt,Θt+1). We parameterize f (·) as a linear
spline.17 Expression (8) can be viewed either as a tool to compute equilibrium in heterogeneous-
agent economies, following Krusell and Smith (1998) or as an assumption that households and
investors are boundedly rational and formulate simple forecast rules for the aggregate state. To
verify that the decision rule is accurate, we both compute the R2 for each (Θt,Θt+1) realized in
simulations and follow Den Haan (2010) by comparing the realized price with the 15, 30, 45, and
17We have found that a linear spline performs better than a linear function. The relationship is approximately
linear in periods with no default and linear in periods with some default, although the line bends when default kicks
in. A linear spline flexibly captures this relationship. For the numerical implementation, we use the discretized price
grid points for our spline knot points.
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100-year ahead forecasts given the realized process of aggregate shocks to verify that the forecast
rule does a good job of computing expected prices many periods into the future and that small
errors do not accumulate. The Appendix shows this is the case.
The model cannot be solved analytically, so a computational algorithm is used. First, the
household problem is solved for a given forecast rule and mortgage spreads by discretization and
backward induction. The model is simulated for 19,000 periods with the home price determined by
(7). Given the distribution of mortgages originated in each state, the break-even spread for each
aggregate state is determined according to (6), and the AR(1) forecast regression (8) is run in the
simulated data for each (Θt,Θt+1). Finally, the forecast rule is updated based on the regression
and the spread is updated based on the break-even spread, and the entire procedure is repeated
until the forecast rules and spreads converge.
4 Calibration
Our calibration proceeds in three steps. First, we select the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to
reflect modern business cycles in the United States. Second, we exogenously calibrate a number
of parameters to standard values in the macro and housing literature. The final parameters are
calibrated internally to match moments of the data. Our model does a good job of matching the
life cycle and population distributions of assets and mortgage debt. Furthermore, as a validation
exercise, we show that our model quantitatively matches quasi-experimental evidence on the effects
of payment reductions on default.
Throughout, we calibrate to the data using a model in which all loans are fixed rate mortgages
to reflect the predominant mortgage type in the United States. Table 1 summarizes the variables
and their calibrated values. The calibration is annual.
4.1 Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks
We consider an economy that occasionally experiences crises akin to what occurred in the Great
Recession. To trigger such a downturn, we combine a deep and persistent recession – which lowers
aggregate income and leads to more frequent negative idiosyncratic shocks – with a tightening of
credit in the form of a stricter downpayment constraints. Several papers argue that tightening credit
helped amplify the bust and model this as a tightening LTV constraint (e.g., Favilukis et al., 2017;
Justiniano et al., 2019). We consequently assume that credit always tightens in a crisis and then
stochastically reverts to being loose in expansions (but not in recessions). Since there is insufficient
data to evaluate how monetary policy differs in various credit regimes, we assume that income and
monetary policy are identical in recessions with high and low credit and expansions with high and
low credit. This implies that the transition matrix between the five aggregate states Θt ∈{Crisis
With Tight Credit, Recession With Tight Credit, Recession With Loose Credit, Expansion With
Tight Credit, Expansion With Loose Credit} can be represented as a transition matrix between
three states {Crisis, Recession, Expansion} along with a probability that credit switches form tight
to loose in the tight credit expansion state.
We calibrate the Markov transition matrix between crisis, recession, and expansion based on
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Table 1: Model Parameters in Baseline Parameterization
Param Description Value Param Description Value
T Years in Life 45 cm Variable Moving Cost as % of Price 3.0%
R Retirement 35 km Fixed Moving Cost 0.1
ρ Log Income Decline in Retirement 0.35 cr Variable Refi Cost as % of Mortgage 1.0%
τ0 Constant in Tax Function 0.8 kr Fixed Refi Cost 0.04
τ1 Curvature Tax Function 0.18 da Default Cost Dist Lower Bound 39.75
γ CRRA 3.0 db Default Cost Dist Upper Bound 49.75
ξ Bequest Motive Shifter 0.570 q Rent 0.20
ψ Bequest Motive Multiplier 250 m Maint Cost as % of Prices 2.5%
a Utility From Homeownership 6.355 ζ Prob of Moving Shock 1/9
β Discount Factor 0.95 λ Prob Default Flag Removed 1/3
Υ Foreclosure Sale Recovery % 0.654 Homeownership Rate 65.0%
φloose Max LTV, Loose Credit 95.0% φtight Max LTV, Tight Credit 80.0%
r Short Rate [0.26%, 1.32%, 3.26%] (crisis, recession, expansion)
Y agg Aggregate Income [0.0976, 0.1426, 0.1776]
See appendix for transition matrix for Θt and Y
id
t .
Note: This table shows parameters for the baseline calibration. Average income is normalized to one. There are five
aggregate states, Θt ∈{Crisis With Tight Credit, Recession With Tight Credit, Recession With Loose Credit,
Expansion With Tight Credit, Expansion With Loose Credit}, but we assume that income and monetary policy are
the same in a recession with loose or tight credit and in an expansion with loose or tight credit. The tuples of
interest rates reflect the interest rate in a crisis, recession, and expansion, respectively.
the frequency and duration of NBER recessions and expansions. We use the NBER durations and
frequencies to determine the probability of a switch between an expansion and crisis or recession,
and we assume that crises happen every 75 years and that all other NBER recessions are regular
recessions. We assume that every time the economy exits a crisis or recession it switches to an
expansion and that crises affect idiosyncratic income in the same way as a regular recession but last
longer and involve a larger aggregate income drop, with a length calibrated to match the average
duration of the Great Depression and Great Recession. A regular recession reduces aggregate
income by 3.5%, while a crisis reduces it by 8.0%, consistent with Guvenen et al.’s (2014) data
on the decline in log average earnings per person in recessions since 1980. For the probability of
reverting to loose credit from tight credit in an expansion, we choose 2.0%, so that when credit
tightens it does so persistently but credit loosens quickly enough so that a large number of crises
begin in the loose credit state. Our results are not sensitive to perturbing this target. The full
transition matrices can be found in the appendix.
For the idiosyncratic income process, we match the countercyclical left skewness in idiosyncratic
income shocks found by Guvenen et al. (2014). Left skewness is crucial to accurately capturing the
dynamics of a housing crisis because the literature on mortgage default has found that large income
shocks are crucial drivers of default. To incorporate left skewness, we calibrate log idiosyncratic
income to follow a Gaussian AR(1) with an autocorrelation of 0.91 and standard deviation of 0.21
following Floden and Linde (2001) in an expansion but to have left skewness in the shock distribution
in recessions and crises. We discretize the income process in an expansion by matching the mean
and standard deviation of shocks using the method of Farmer and Toda (2017), which discretizes
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the distribution and optimally adjusts it to match the mean and variance of the distribution to
be discretized. For the bust, we add the standardized skewness of the 2008-9 income change
distribution from Guvenen et al. (2014) to moments to be matched, generating a shock distribution
with left skewness. This gives a distribution with a negative mean income change in busts and leads
to income being too volatile, so we shift the mean of the idiosyncratic shock distribution in busts
to match the standard deviation of aggregate log income in the data. In doing so, we choose
the income distribution of the newly born generations to match the lifecycle profile of income in
Guvenen et al. (2019).18 We normalize the income process so that average aggregate income is
equal to one.
4.2 Interest Rates and Lender SDF
Recall that the lender SDF, mt,t+1, is a function of today’s state, Θt, and tomorrow’s state, Θt+1,
so we must calibrate m(Θt,Θt+1). To do so, we match interest rate data, mortgage spread data,
and options-pricing results from Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2011).
In calibrating the SDF, our goal is to ensure that lenders charge for mortgage contracts
that provide insurance in crisis states. Because the economy only switches into a crisis from
an expansion (with either tight or loose credit), we allow m (Expansion, Crisis) to differ from
m (Expansion, Non-Crisis). Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2011) show that in order to match the
prices of out-of-the-money S&P500 options, one needs a model with jumps, where the ratio of the
risk-neutral jump intensity to the true jump intensity is 6.1 (see Table II of their paper). We will
think of our crisis as a jump event and thus calibrate the risk price for the crisis state relative to
non-crisis states as 6.1; that is, we set m (Expansion, Crisis) = 6.1 ×m (Expansion, Non-Crisis).
In this way, the lenders charge a high price for insurance against crisis states consistent with the
high price of out-of-the-money options.
To keep things simple, for m (Non-Expansion,Θt+1) we assume that the SDF is constant re-
gardless of tomorrow’s state Θt+1 and is moreover equal to m (Expansion, Non-Crisis). Finally, our
lender SDF is required to satisfy:
Et [m(Θt,Θt+1)] =
1
1 + rt + κ
.
Here rt is the short-rate in state Θt. Lenders require that a sure payoff of one at date t+ 1 yields
a return of rt + κ, where κ captures the costs of making mortgage loans, including administrative
and regulatory costs that may increase the lender cost of capital. We set κ so that in an all-FRM
economy under our baseline monetary policy, the average spread between the FRM rate and a 10-
year bond in the model is 1.65%, which is the average spread between the 30-year fixed mortgage
rate and the 10-year bond in the data from 1983 to 2013 from FRED.19 20 We find κ to be 125
18Rather than including a deterministic income profile, we start households at lower incomes and let them stochas-
tically gain income over time as the income distribution converges to its ergodic distribution. This does a good job
of matching the age-income profile in the data as shown in the Appendix.
19The yield on the 10-year Treasury is computed internally within the model. The SDF used to price the 10-year
Treasury reflects expected short rates and the higher risk price of the crisis state with m (Expansion, Crisis) =
6.1×m (Expansion, Non-Crisis). It does not reflect κ, which only impacts the lender SDF.
20FRED uses the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey to report 30-year fixed mortgage rates. This
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basis points, and we impose this κ for all other mortgage designs.21 In Appendix D.3, we consider
a robustness check in which κ is time-varying and κt rises in a crisis to reflect a higher lender cost
of capital.
We calibrate short rates during expansions and recessions to historical real rates from 1985-
2007.22 23 We find that short rates equal 1.32% on average during recessions and 3.26% during
expansions. For the crisis state, we assume that the real short rate is 3.0% less than during
expansions, or 0.26%.24
To keep things simple, for m (Non-Expansion,Θt+1) we assume that the SDF is constant regard-
less of tomorrow’s state Θt+1 and is moreover equal to m (Expansion, Non-Crisis). Summarizing,
we require that the SDF in expansions satisfies:
m (Expansion,Crisis) = 6.1×m (Expansion, Non-Crisis)
Et [mt,t+1] =
1
1 + rt + κ
,
and in non-expansions satisfies only the second equation regardless of tomorrow’s state. This SDF
implies that lenders place considerably more weight on transitions to crisis states and thus charge
a premium for insurance policies that pay off in crisis states.25 26
We maintain these short rates, mortgage rates, and the SDF as we vary the mortgage contract
and monetary policy to put different contracts on the same footing. In practice, mortgage design
affects monetary policy, as we discuss in Section 7, and so with a different mortgage design the
Central Bank may set different interest rates.
survey may under-represent subprime and non-conforming loans. To the extent that the overall mortgage spread
should be a bit higher, this would be primarily reflected in a higher κ. Our key insights regarding mortgage design
would not be materially impacted.
21The remaining 40 bps is due to prepayment risk and default risk. Prepayment risk accounts for 13.82 bps and
default risk accounts for 26.18 bps.
22We use a real model to focus the model on the benefits of interest-rate indexation in a scenario like the Great
Recession. Indeed, our central points are fairly orthogonal to the literature on “mortgage tilt” and inflation, with the
exception of the possibility that adjustable-rate borrowers may see their payments rise if inflation is high in a crisis
and the central bank raises interest rates. We consider such a scenario in Section 7.
23Our model abstracts from regional heterogeneity in the strength of housing cycles and recessions. Given such
heterogeneity, monetary policy – and mortgage design – is a somewhat blunt instrument because it does not treat
different regions differently. See Beraja et al. (2019) for evidence on heterogeneity in monetary policy across regions
due to differences in the equity positions of households and Piskorski and Seru (2018) for a discussion of the potential
gains from indexing mortgages to local economic conditions.
24In practice, interest rates adjust gradually to the aggregate state of the economy. We assume immediate ad-
justment to keep the number of aggregate states tractable. With gradual adjustment, ARMs would provide less
insurance. This is another plus for the EK convertible mortgage , as agents may want to keep their mortgage as an
FRM if ARM rates are not adjusting or are adjusting the wrong way.
25Since bonds hedge high marginal utility states of the world, our model implies a negative bond beta and a
downward-sloping term structure of interest rates. Campbell et al. (2019) estimate a negative bond-stock beta for
the post-2000 period. When we implement a Volcker-like monetary policy in Section 7.1, in which rates rise during
the crisis instead of fall, our model instead features a positive bond beta and a positive term premium. This is
consistent with the findings of Campbell et al. (2019), who document a positive bond-stock beta during the 1980s
anti-inflationary Volcker regime.
26Our SDF also satisfies the Hansen-Jagannathan bound. The value of σ(m)
E[m]
is 0.55, whereas the Sharpe ratio on
the equity market is around 0.4.
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4.3 Other Calibration Targets
We set a number of parameters to standard values in the literature or to directly match moments
in the data.
We assume households live for 45 years, roughly matching ages 25 to 70 in the data. Households
retire after 35 years, at which point idiosyncratic income is frozen at its terminal level minus a 0.35
log point retirement decrease. The tax system is calibrated as in Heathcote et al. (2017), with
τ0 = 0.80 and τ1 = 0.18. We use a discount factor of β = 0.95 and a CRRA of γ = 3.0.
Moving and refinancing involve fixed and variable costs. We set the fixed cost of moving equal to
10% of average annual income, or roughly $5,000. The proportional costs, paid by both buyers and
sellers, equal 3% of the house value to reflect closing costs and realtor fees. Refinancing involves a
fixed cost of 4% of average annual income, or roughly $2,000, as well as variable cost equal to 1% of
the mortgage amount to roughly match average refinancing costs quoted by the Federal Reserve.27
Renters pay a rent of q = 0.20 to match a rent-to-income ratio of 20%. Homeowners must pay
a maintenance cost equal to 2.5% of the house value every year. We calibrate the moving shock
ζ so that homeowners move an average of every 9 years as in the American Housing Survey. The
homeownership rate is set to match a long-run average homeownership rate of 65 percent in the
United States.
Υ, the fraction of the price recovered by the bank after foreclosure, is set to 64.5 percent. This
combines the 27 percentage point foreclosure discount in Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2011) with
the fixed costs of foreclosing upon, maintaining, and marketing a property, estimated to be 8.5%
of the sale price according to Andersson and Mayock (2014).28
We assume that the maximum LTV at origination under loose credit is 95%, corresponding to
the highest spike in the distribution of LTV at origination in the Great Recession, and under tight
credit is 80%, which is the conforming loan limit LTV. This generates crises with a tightening of
credit that feature a price decline similar to what we observed in the Great Recession.
We finally calibrate four parameters internally. We calibrate a, the utility benefit of owning a
home, so that house prices are approximately five times the average pre-tax income in our econ-
omy.29 We choose the bequest motive parameters ψ and ξ to match the ratio of total net worth at
age 60 to age 45 in the SCF for the median and 10th percentile households. Intuitively, ψ, which
controls the overall strength of the bequest motive, is pinned down by the median growth rate,
while ξ, which controls the extent to which bequests are a luxury, is pinned down by the 10th
percentile growth rate.30 We finally calibrate d̄, the average default cost, so that in simulations
of the impulse response to a housing downturn akin to the Great Recession described below we
27Reassuringly, the preference and transaction cost parameters we use are similar to other papers in the literature,
such as Chen, Michaux, and Roussanov (2019).
28Much of the literature calibrates to the “loss severity rate” defined as the fraction of the mortgage balance
recovered by the lender. We calibrate to a fraction of the price because of a recent empirical literature that finds that
in distressed markets, the loss recovery rate is much lower (e.g. Andersson and Mayock, 2014), which is consistent
with a discount relative to price rather than a constant loss severity rate.
29In the SCF, the mean price to income ratio for homeowners is 4. Because homeowners in our model are richer
than the average household, the ratio of the mean price to average income is 5.
30These two moments are similar to those used by Kaplan et al. (2019) to calibrate the parameters controlling the
bequest motive and the extent to which it is a luxury in their paper.
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Table 2: Consumption and House Prices In Model vs. Data
SD of log (C) SD of log (HPI) Corr of log (C) and log (HPI)
Data 0.021 0.055 0.461
Model 0.031 0.070 0.511
Note: This table compares the model and data for the standard deviation of log consumption and log house prices. The data
we use is annual from 1975 to 2018. For house prices we use the FHFA purchase-only index, FRED series USSTHPI. For
consumption, we calculate real personal consumption expenditures net of housing expenditures by subtracting ,the “Services:
Housing and Utilities” subcategory of real personal consumption expenditures, FRED series DHUTRC, from the Real PCE
data, FRED series PCECCA. The data is HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 100 so as to not over-smooth out the
slow-moving house price series. The model uses 18,900 years of simulated data.
match that 8.00 percent of the housing stock was foreclosed upon from 2006 to 2013 (Guren and
McQuade, 2019).31 We match these moments within 0.15% of their target values as shown in the
Appendix.
4.4 Performance of Model in Stochastic Simulations
The first step in evaluating the performance of our model is to consider how well endogenous
aggregates in the model match time-series moments in the data. Table 2 compares aggregate
consumption and house prices in our model relative to the data. The correlation of house prices
and consumption is very close to the data, although each series is slightly too volatile. Overall,
these series compare favorably to their counterparts in the data.
4.5 Lifecycle Patterns and Distributions Across the Population
The model does a good job matching the lifecycle patterns and the overall distribution of debt and
assets in the Survey of Consumer Finances for 2001, 2004, and 2007. Figure 1 shows the lifecycle
patterns, while Figure 2 shows the distributions across the population. In both figures, the pooled
SCF data for 2001 to 2007 is in dashed lines and the model analogues are in solid lines.
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the homeownership rate over the lifecycle. The model slightly
underestimates the homeownership rate of the very young and over-estimates the homeownership
rate of the middle aged.
Panels B and C of Figure 1 shows the mean, median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of
the loan to value ratio (LTV) and payment to income ratio (PTI) by age, and panels A and B
of Figure 2 shows the distribution of LTV and PTI across the population. The model somewhat
over-predicts the LTV ratios of the young individuals in the bottom half of the LTV distribution.
This has minimal impact on our quantitative results, however, since these homeowners are not at
risk of default when the crisis hits. The model does reasonably well in capturing the LTV and
PTI distributions across all ages, although it somewhat overstates the number of individuals with
LTVs between 80 percent and 95 percent as is the case with any model with a single hard LTV
constraint. We also find that PTIs that are too high for the old because mortgages amortize to the
end of life. Because most of the equilibrium effects in our model come from the purchase, refinance,
31We choose da and db, the bounds of the uniform distribution from which d is chosen, to add a small bit of mass
around d̄. In the calibration, d̄ = 44.75, da = 39.75, and db = 49.75.
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Figure 1: Lifecycle Patterns: SCF vs. Model


























A. Home Ownership Rate
































































































E. Fraction of Owners Refinancing


























F. Average Income vs. Consumption
Consumption
Income
Note: This figure compares the baseline calibration of the model with all FRMs (solid lines) to SCF data from 2001 to 2007
(dashed lines) in panels A-D. Panels E and F are constructed based only on the model. Panel A shows the homeownership
rate. Panel B shows the mean, median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of loan to value ratios for homeowners, and panel
C shows the same statistics for the payment to income ratio. Panel D shows the mean, median, 10th percentile, and 90th
percentile of liquid assets along with median total wealth. Panel E shows the refinance rate, and Panel F shows consumption
and income in the model.
and default decisions of the young who have relatively high LTVs, the financial position of elderly
homeowners has little impact on our results.
Panel D of Figure 1 shows percentiles of the liquid wealth and the median of total wealth by age,
and panels C and D of Figure 2 show the distributions of total and liquid wealth in the population.
The model does a reasonably good job matching median total wealth over the lifecycle and liquid
wealth at young ages. Agents in the model accumulate more liquid assets in retirement than in
the data. Again, this is not a significant issue, as the old do not play a crucial role in the housing
market in our model. The data also has a thicker right tail of very wealthy individuals. Our
model is designed to capture the impact of credit constraints and mortgages on housing markets,
so capturing the extremely wealthy is not relevant for our exercise.
Finally, Panels E and F of Figure 1 show the fraction of owners refinancing and income and
consumption over the life cycle, respectively. Most refinancing is of the cash-out variety because the
FRM rate does not fluctuate dramatically due to expectations-hypothesis-type logic. Refinancing is
relatively low until retirement, at which point it jumps so that agents can smooth their consumption.
The excessive refinancing of the old is not crucial to our results because the old are not the marginal
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Figure 2: Distributions Across Population: SCF vs. Model
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Note: This figure compares the baseline calibration of the model with all FRMs (solid lines) to SCF data from 2001 to 2007
(dashed lines). Panel A shows loan to value ratios in 10 percentage point bins for homeowners, and panel B shows the payment
to income ratio for homeowners in 0.025 bins. Panel C shows total wealth relative to mean income in bins of 0.2, while panel
D shows liquid wealth relative to mean income in bins of 0.2. In all figures, the model and data are binned identically.
buyer or defaulter. Income follows a standard lifecycle profile, and consumption is smoother than
income and increasing as individuals age, consistent with buffer stock models of consumption.
4.6 Calibration Evaluation Using Quasi-Experimental Evidence on Default
To evaluate the extent to which our model quantitatively captures the impact of payment reduc-
tions, we compare our model to quasi-experimental evidence from Fuster and Willen (2017). Fuster
and Willen study a sample of homeowners who purchased ALT-A hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages
during 2005-2008 period and quickly fell underwater as house prices declined. Under a hybrid ARM,
the borrower pays a fixed rate for several years (typically five to ten) and then the ARM “resets”
to a spread over the short rate once a year. These borrowers were unable to refinance because they
were almost immediately underwater, so when their rates reset to reflect the low short rates after
2008, they received a large and expected reduction in their monthly payment.
Fuster and Willen provide two key facts for our purposes. First, they show that even for ALT-A
borrowers – who have low documentation and high LTVs relative to the population – at 135 percent
LTV the average default hazard prior to reset was only about 24 percent.32 The fact that so many
32This figure is based on the default hazard in months 30 to 60 in Figure 1b. Fuster and Willen measure “default”
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Figure 3: Fit to Fuster and Willen (2017) Natural Experiment





























A. Effect of Rate Reset on Default
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B. Effect of LTV on Default
Note: The data from Fuster and Willen (107) come from column 1 of Table A.1 in their paper, which is also used in
Figure 3 of their paper. The model estimates come form comparing a 2/1 ARM to a 1/1 ARM in our model.
households with significant negative equity do not default implies that there are high default costs.
It is also consistent with a literature that finds evidence for a “double trigger” model of default
whereby both negative equity and a shock are necessary to trigger default, as is the case for most
default in our model.
Second, Fuster and Willen use an empirical design that compares households just before and
after they get a rate reset and show that the hazard of default for a borrower receiving a 3.0 percent
rate reduction falls by about 55 percentage points.
We evaluate the extent to which our model can match Fuster and Willen’s estimates by simulat-
ing their rate reset quasi-experiment within our model. In particular, we compare the crisis default
behavior of agents in our model with a 2/1 ARM that will reset next period with the behavior
of an agent with a 1/1 ARM that has reset this period. This corresponds to the treatment and
control used by Fuster and Willen. We assume that these borrowers are an infinitesimal part of
the market, so we can consider them in partial equilibrium, and we compute their default rates at
different LTVs with the 2/1 ARM and 1/1 ARM. To deal with the fact that the ALT-A sample
used by Fuster and Willen is not representative of the population, we roughly match the assets,
age, and income of the homeowners we consider to households with hybrid ARMs that have yet
to reset in the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances.33 Finally, we assume that homeowners have a
fixed rate corresponding to the FRM rate in the boom and reset to the ARM rate in the crisis
Figure 3 compares the calibrated model with the findings of Fuster and Willen (2015). Panel
A shows the impact of rate reductions on default in the model and Fuster and Willen’s estimates.
as becoming 60 days delinquent rather than an actual foreclosure, so the actual default rate might be slightly lower.
33In the SCF, we find that the ALT-A borrowers have low assets, are young, and have moderate-to-low income, as
one would expect. Due to a limited number of observations, rather than using the ages and assets of households in
the SCF, we assume a uniform distribution between the 25th and 75th percentiles of age and assets in the SCF data
and assume that individuals in the Fuster-Willen experiment have moderate to low income.
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Overall, the fit is quite good. The model slightly over-predicts the impact of small rate reductions
on the default hazard and under-predicts the impact of large rate reductions. The right panel shows
the baseline default rate under the 2/1 ARM at various LTVs relative to the default rate at 135
percent LTV. LTV reductions have modestly larger effects than in the data until one gets below
100 percent, at which point the default hazard falls off in the model but not in Fuster and Willen’s
data.34 The model’s fit to the Fuster and Willen quasi-experimental evidence suggests that the
model will accurately capture the effect of payment and LTV changes on default.
5 ARM vs. FRM: The Economics of State Contingent Mortgages
Having created and calibrated a laboratory to study mortgage design and its interaction with
monetary policy, we now use our model to assess various mortgages. We focus on a crisis scenario
that combines a housing bust and a deep recession as in the Great Recession. This allows us
to analyze mortgage designs proposed to address the problems revealed by the Great Recession,
which is the focus of the recent literature. Additionally, the equilibrium feedbacks that our model
features are most interesting and potent in a downturn with a price-default spiral. However, we
also consider the performance of various contracts unconditional on a crisis in Section 5.3. In this
section we focus on conventional monetary policy that reduces real rates in a crisis, and we consider
alternate monetary policies, including the case in which the central bank raises real rates in a bust,
in Section 7.
To analyze a housing downturn, we simulate an impulse response where in the five years prior
to the downturn the economy is in an expansion with loose credit and when the crisis hits the
economy falls into a deep recession and the LTV constraint tightens. We assume that the crisis
lasts at least three years, after which the economy stochastically exits according to the transition
matrix so that the average crisis length is 5.66 years. We study the impulse responses of prices,
default rates, and consumption to the resulting downturn, which we compute by averaging together
100 simulations with random shocks prior to the five-year expansion and subsequent to the first
three years of the crisis. We also compare mortgage designs in stochastic simulations.
To analyze the effect of mortgage design in such a crisis, we first compare an economy with
all FRM borrowers to an economy with all ARM borrowers. This provides us with most of the
economic intuition regarding the benefits of adding state contingency to mortgages. In Section 6,
we consider more complex mortgage designs.
5.1 Economic Intuition: FRM vs. ARM
Our baseline case is an economy in which the only available mortgage to home purchasers is a
FRM. The results are illustrated by the blue lines in Figure 4.
34Fuster and Willen find a substantial default hazard below 100 percent LTV for three likely reasons. First, the
combined LTV that Fuster and Willen use is likely measured with error both due to missing liens in the data and
due to error in the automatic valuation model. Second, Fuster and Willen measure default as 60 day delinquency and
not a final foreclosure. In areas with substantial foreclosure backlogs, borrowers who are above water can become
delinquent before they sell. Finally, there are some frictions in terms of time to sell and the fixed costs of sale that
may cause above-water households to default. In our model, there is minimal default for above water households
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Figure 4: FRM vs. FRM→ARM: Housing Market Outcomes




































































































Cum Diff FRM - FRM->ARM









































Note: The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under FRM
and FRM→ARM. In the downturn, the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent and the economy falls into a deep
downturn for an average of 5.66 years.
The model with all FRMs generates a housing crisis in the model of a similar magnitude to
the the one experienced in the United States between 2006 and 2012 as shown in Figure 4. Prices
fall by about a third, which closely matches the peak to trough decline in national repeat sales
house price indices.35 At the depths of the crisis, roughly 40 percent of homeowners are underwater
and approximately 70 percent of homeowners have under 20 percent equity and cannot refinance
given the tightened LTV constraint. The combination of negative equity and recession leads 8.00
percent of the housing stock to default (recall that matching the fraction of the housing stock that
defaulted from 2006 to 2013 is a calibration target). Finally, consumption falls by 11.4 percent due
to the sudden and persistent decline in income and the large number of constrained households.
The decline is slightly higher than the decline in the data.36
because some households get a moving shock with very low equity and decide to default.
35Our model does not match the time series of house price indices because prices fall to their lowest level on the
impact of the shock, while in the data they decline gradually. This is the case because our Walrasian model does not
have any house price momentum. See Guren (2018) for a summary of the literature on momentum.
36With a 2.5 percent annual trend, real personal consumption expenditures fell 9.4 percent relative to trend peak
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Figure 5: Baseline vs. Model With No LTV Tightening
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Note: The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under FRM.
In the baseline case, the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent and the economy falls into a deep downturn for an
average of 5.66 years. In the case without LTV tightening, the maximum LTV stays at 95 percent but the same shocks hit the
economy and the monetary policy is unchanged.
To elucidate the mechanisms behind the housing downturn, Figure 5 compares numerical results
for the FRM economy in the baseline model where the LTV tightens to 80 percent in a crisis to
a model in which the LTV constraint remains at 95 percent when a crisis hits. Without the LTV
constraint tightening, house prices fall by 10.0 percent and gradually mean revert as opposed to
falling 29.5 percent at the onset of the crisis, rising about 12.5 percent as the economy gets out
of the crisis, and then slowly mean revert as credit stochastically loosens. Part of the reason that
prices fall by less is there is no foreclosure crisis: After eight years only 3.87 percent of the housing
stock has been foreclosed upon, as opposed to 8.00 percent in the baseline model. Consumption
falls by 8.9 percent rather than 11.4 percent. These results show that most of the decline in house
prices and defaults in our model can be attributed to tightening credit conditions.37 The Appendix
compares mortgage designs in this environment in which the LTV constraint does not tighten.
We examine the differential impacts of adjustable-rate mortgages through two experiments.
to trough in the recession. Our model may have a larger decline than in the data because we do not capture the
upper tail of the income distribution well and because we do not model lenders.
37There is an active debate on whether the crisis is best explained by changes in credit conditions like the tightening
LTV constraint of our analysis, or some other factor. Some papers such as Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwer-
burgh (2017) argue that a tightening LTV constraint explains the whole crisis. Others, such as Kaplan, Mitman,
and Violante (2019) argue that credit conditions have essentially no effect on house prices. Our results provide a
significant effect of credit conditions because rental markets are segmented from owner-occupied housing markets
(Greenwald and Guren, 2019). Greenwald and Guren show that in practice housing markets are quite segmented,
although not perfectly segmented. Accounting for imperfect segmentation would be computationally difficult and
would change our results in two ways. First, we would need some other mechanism such as a shock to beliefs to
generate the a decline in house prices of one third. Because the source of the decline in house prices is not central
to the economics of our model, this change would not have a significant effect on our results. Second, with some
conversion, the equilibrium effect of foreclosures on prices would be a bit smaller, making mortgage design slightly
less powerful.
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In the first, we assume that home purchasers have fixed-rate mortgages pre-crisis, but that when
the crisis hits, all mortgages are unexpectedly converted to adjustable-rate mortgages with the
spread based on the origination state of the mortgage. Because the central bank lowers the short
rate in the crisis and this is fully passed through to households under ARM, mortgage payments
fall dramatically. This experiment, which we call the FRM→ARM counterfactual, is a useful
thought experiment to understand the mechanisms at work in our model because it holds fixed
the distribution of individuals across idiosyncratic states when the crisis hits and isolates the ex-
post effect of adjustable-rate mortgages on the severity of the crisis. In the second experiment, we
consider an economy with ARMs both before and after the crisis hits, allowing for ex-ante behavior
to affect the distribution of households across idiosyncratic states at the beginning of the crisis.
5.1.1 Ex-Post Effect of Switching From FRM to ARM
The FRM→ARM counterfactual is shown in purple lines in Figure 4. Relative to the baseline case,
the housing crisis is less severe. House prices fall by 3.28 percentage points less and 29.8 percent
fewer households default.
Under FRM, the rate reduction is not passed through to households to the same extent for
two reasons. First, the long end of the yield curve moves by less, which we call the yield curve
channel. Second, some homeowners do not have the means to satisfy the tighter LTV constraint
and cannot refinance, which we call the underwater household channel.38 Because of left-skewness
of the income shock distribution in the crisis, a significant fraction of the underwater homeowners
experience a drop in their income. Those with little savings default because they would have to cut
their consumption substantially – and in many cases to zero – to make their mortgage payment,
which causes them to be willing to bear the utility cost of default. Default increases the supply
of homes on the market, further pushing down prices, which in turn leads to more default. This
phenomenon is the canonical price-default spiral.
In the ARM economy, by contrast, the mortgage payment is pegged to the prevailing short rate
in the market, so payments fall automatically. They also fall by more than under FRM because
the short end of the yield curve adjusts by more than the long end. Many households that default
with an FRM can avoid default, short-circuiting the default spiral and causing a less severe housing
crisis.39
Additionally, because FRMs are priced off of long-term rates, which fall via by less due to
expectations-hypothesis-type logic, buying is more affordable in the ARM economy for young
renters during the crisis than in the FRM economy. This implies that the demand by renters is
38Refinancing is also costly in our model, which further works to limit monetary policy pass-through. Beyond the
direct costs of refinancing, Johnson, Meier, and Toubia (2015), Keys, Pope, and Pope (2016), Andersen et al. (2018)
and Berger et al. (2018) have documented apparent behavioral inertia in mortgage refinancing. While we do not
formally model it, it is clear such behavioral inertia would further amplify the gains of the ARM mortgage design
over the FRM design.
39Beraja et al. (2019) point out that while ARMs may lead to stronger effects of monetary policy on consumption
in a crisis when lots of household are underwater, they may be weaker in normal times. This is because under FRM
more households refinance when interest rates fall and liquidate home equity as long as they are paying the fixed
costs of refinancing. While it is true that more households refinance and take out cash in a normal recession under
FRM in our model, this effect on consumption is offset by the fact that ARM rates fall by more due to the yield
curve effect. Thus, in a normal recession, we continue to find that ARMs help stabilize the housing market.
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Figure 6: FRM vs. FRM→ARM: Default and Renter Demand By Age









































Note: The figure shows the mass of households of each age defaulting and purchasing after renting last period in the first
period of a simulated crisis under FRM and FRM→ARM along with the difference between the two lines. To ensure that
the differences are entirely due to the policy functions, we compare FRM to FRM→ARM and evaluate the policy functions
assuming the price is the realized FRM price.
higher when the economy switches to ARMs, which further ameliorates the impact of the housing
crisis.
These effects are summarized in Figure 6, which plots the mass of homeowners defaulting and
renters purchasing by age in the period in which the crisis begins. The results are plotted for
both the baseline FRM economy and the FRM→ARM counterfactual, along with the difference.
Because the pre-downturn distribution is the same, this figure only reflects differences in policy
functions between the FRM and FRM→ARM economies. The gap in default is dominated by
young and middle-aged households, and the gap in renter purchases is dominated by homebuyers
around the age of first purchase. Similar comparisons by savings, income, and LTV reveal that
the additional default under FRM comes from low income, low savings, and high LTV borrowers,
while the additional demand comes from renters with the moderate savings and income reflective
of first-time homebuyers.
5.1.2 Ex-Ante Effect of Switching From FRM to ARM
Of course, while useful for expositional purposes, the economy in which all mortgages suddenly
switch to ARMs is unrealistic. We therefore now instead consider an economy in which all mortgages
are adjustable-rate, both pre- and post-crisis. The results are presented in Figure 7, with the FRM
economy shown in blue and the ARM economy shown in orange.
The benefits of adjustable-rate mortgages are reduced relative to the FRM→ARM counterfac-
tual, with prices falling by 2.24 percentage points less and 23.0 percent fewer households defaulting
than under FRM rather than 3.28 percentage points and 29.8 percent under FRM→ARM. These
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Figure 7: FRM vs. ARM: Housing Market Outcomes














































































































































Note: The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under FRM
and ARM both ex ante and ex post . In the downturn, the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent and the economy
falls into a deep downturn for an average of 5.66 years.
figures are summarized for ARM and the mortgage designs we consider subsequently in Table 3,
which summarizes our main findings under the baseline monetary policy.
The crisis is worse in the ARM economy relative to the FRM→ARM economy because young
homeowners understand the hedging properties of the ARM mortgage and take on more risk,
primarily by holding less savings in order to increase their consumption in constrained states.
Indeed, 2.3% more homeowners between the ages of 26 and 45 have less than a quarter of the average
annual pre-tax income in savings under ARM than under FRM. This creates macro fragility, which
households do not internalize. The degree to which the ex-post benefits of ARMs are undone by
the ex-ante buildup of fragility – at least for house prices and default – is a numerical result. This
highlights the need for realistic quantitative models of the type we analyze.40
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Figure 8: FRM vs. ARM: Household Welfare Loss Conditional on Crisis by Age































Note: The figure shows the percentage point difference in consumption equivalent household welfare between FRM and ARM
for each cohort alive when the crisis hits. Consumption equivalent household welfare is calculated as the equivalent variation
amount each agent would be willing to reduce their consumption per year of their remaining life to avoid a crisis. We show the
difference between FRM and ARM for generations alive when the crisis hits. The y axis is the difference between the FRM
and ARM economies for this calculation, with a negative number indicating household are worse off under FRM. We repeat
the calculations separately for owners, as indicated in the legend. For computational reasons, we cap the gain for any given
individual at 100%. This restriction affects a tiny number of older people who have very little remaining lifetime consumption
but derive significant utility from owning a house.
5.1.3 Household Welfare Benefits of Switching From FRM to ARM in a Crisis
To further evaluate the benefits of switching from FRM to ARM, we calculate the household
consumption-equivalent welfare cost of the crisis under each mortgage. The conditional welfare cost
is the amount an agent would be willing to reduce their consumption per year of their remaining
life to avoid a crisis. This is calculated as equivalent variation and is aggregated by the pre-crisis
distribution of individuals across states for agents of each age living when the crisis hits, as detailed
in the Appendix. Because different cohorts have different remaining lives, we report results by
cohort rather than an aggregate number. Importantly, the welfare metric we use is for households
only and does not include lender consumption.41 This is because in our model lenders break even
subject to a calibrated stochastic discount factor, which means that we cannot calculate lender
consumption or calculate lender welfare. Instead, we report in Table 3 the present value of losses
to lenders over a crisis using the lender SDF, and our mortgage pricing condition ensures they
break even on average, again subject to their SDF. Our welfare metric also does not include a
social cost of foreclosure beyond the private utility cost of foreclosure. Estimates of the pecuniary
social costs of foreclosure range from $50,000 to $80,000 and do not typically include the large
non-pecuniary costs to foreclosed-upon households, which may or may not be part of the utility
default cost (Diamond, Guren, and Tan, 2019).
Figure 8 shows the welfare difference separately by age for both renters and owners and for the
overall population. A negative value indicates a larger welfare loss under FRMs than in the ARM
counterfactual. The Figure shows that owners benefit from the switch to ARMs significantly: Young
40Allowing for multiple house sizes would likely further amplify the ex-ante buildup of fragility because households
would upgrade to larger houses due to the insurance provided by ARM.
41See Campbell, Clara, and Cocco (2018) for a fuller discussion of issues related to lender consumption.
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Table 3: Moments From Downturn Simulations For Various Mortgage Designs
Design FRM ARM EK FRMUR Option ARM
Pct Point Reduction in Max ∆P Rel to FRM 2.24 2.90 0.45 6.10
Pct Point Reduction in Max ∆C Rel to FRM 0.79 0.63 0.05 1.81
Share Defaulting over 8 Years 8.00% 6.16% 6.20% 7.37% 6.52%
Decline in PV of Mortgages 2.55% 3.32% 2.52% 2.62% 3.62%
When Entering Crisis
Note: The Table shows the indicated statistics for each mortgage design averaging across 100 simulations of a crisis that lasts
5.66 years after an expansion with loose credit as described in the main text. The top row shows the percentage point change in
the peak-to-trough change in price relative to FRM, with a positive number indicating a less severe price decline. The second
row shows the percentage point change in the peak-to-trough change in consumption relative to FRM, with a positive number
indicating a less severe decline in consumption. The third row shows the share of the housing stock defaulting after 8 years.
The fourth row shows the percentage point decline in the present value of the mortgages in the economy when the crisis occurs,
which represents the deterioration of lender balance sheets in the crisis.
owners would be willing to give up nearly 3 percent more of their remaining lifetime consumption
to avoid a crisis under FRM relative to ARM, while older owners would be willing to give up just
over one percent. The number is particularly high for younger owners because they tend to have
lower savings, lower income, and higher LTVs. These households cannot refinance when the crisis
hits due to the LTV constraint, are stuck at a high interest rate, and do not have much liquid
savings to help cushion an income shock. Additionally, they have lower consumption and expect
their income to rise later in life, so they are borrowing constrained and their baseline marginal
utility of consumption is high. Consequently, they are willing to pay a substantial amount of
annual consumption to switch to an ARM, as the lower interest rate translates to a much smaller
minimum payment and boosts consumption substantially. By contrast, renters, and particularly
older renters with high savings, lose under ARM because they face higher house prices. On net,
most generations see a welfare benefit under ARM relative to FRM of between 0 and 1 percent.
5.2 ARM vs. FRM: The Importance of Equilibrium Effects
An important feature of our analysis that differentiates it from the preceding literature is that
house prices and mortgage spreads are determined in equilibrium. Figure 9 shows the impact of
these equilibrium effects on consumption and default in a simulated downturn in our model. To
calculate the impulse response in the ARM economy with no equilibrium effects, we take the price
path and distribution of agents across states from the FRM model as given and calculate default
and consumption under ARM using ARM policy functions computed with the FRM forecast rule.
Figure 9 reveals that the equilibrium feedbacks account for about 34.3% of the difference in default
and 32.1% of the difference in consumption between the ARM and FRM counterfactuals. This
result also highlights an externality that is present in our model: Agents do not take into account
the impact of their mortgage choices on equilibrium prices when making their decisions, yet their
choices have a large impact on equilibrium prices.
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Figure 9: FRM vs. ARM: The Role of Equilibrium Effects
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Note: The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under FRM
and ARM both ex ante and ex post . In the downturn, the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent and the economy
falls into a deep downturn for an average of 5.66 years. For the “no equilibrium effects” counterfactual, we take the price
path and distribution of agents across states from the FRM model as given and report default and consumption using policy
functions computed with ARMs with the FRM forecast rule.
5.3 ARM vs. FRM Not Conditional on a Crisis
We now ask whether ARMs deliver benefits unconditionally rather than focusing on results con-
ditional on a crisis. The first column of Table 4 shows the standard deviation of price, default,
aggregate consumption, and idiosyncratic consumption for stochastic simulations of an all-ARM
relative to an all-FRM economy. It also shows unconditional household welfare, which is calculated
in terms of equivalent variation as the percent increase in per-period consumption that would be
required in the FRM economy to make an agent indifferent between being born in a random pe-
riod in the FRM economy and a random period in the ARM economy. This welfare computation
corresponds to the change in household utility; lenders break even on average in our economy dis-
counting using their calibrated SDF, so unconditional lender welfare is the same across mortgage
designs.
The ARM economy features 1.4% lower house price volatility, 4.1% less default, 21.5% lower
default volatility, and 4.6% lower aggregate consumption volatility. While these are significant
improvements, the household consumption-equivalent welfare benefits are more modest: An agent
would be indifferent between the ARM and FRM economies if their consumption rose by 0.12 per-
cent per year in the FRM economy. This is the case because while aggregate consumption volatility,
default, and default volatility are reduced, the households only have a CRRA of 3, which limits
the welfare consequences of consumption volatility. Furthermore, idiosyncratic shocks dominate
consumption volatility at the household level.42Since ARMs only provide insurance against aggre-
gate shocks, the consumption insurance benefits in normal times are modest. This does, however,
open the door for mortgage designs that provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, a point we
42A variance decomposition makes this point clearly: in the FRM economy, 77.9% of consumption volatility across
individuals is across individuals within periods and within generations, 21.8% is across generations within periods,
and only 0.3% is due to aggregate consumption across periods.
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Table 4: Moments From Stochastic Simulations For Various Mortgage Designs Relative to FRM
Design ARM EK FRMUR Option ARM
Std Dev of Price Rel to FRM 98.6% 96.7% 98.3% 94.3%
St Dev of Default Rate Rel to FRM 78.5% 81.2% 93.1% 73.1%
Mean Default Rate Rel to FRM 95.9% 98.2% 99.1% 106.4%
St Dev of Agg Consumption Rel to FRM 95.4% 96.1% 99.4% 91.8%
Increase in Household Welfare Rel to FRM 0.12% 0.07% 0.02% 0.42%
Notes: Each cell shows the mortgage design indicated by each column as a percentage of FRM for the statistic indi-
cated in each row. Price, default, and aggregate consumption are calculated from aggregate 19,000 year simulations.
Idiosyncratic consumption is calculated by simulating 25,000 individuals each periods for 6,300 years. Household wel-
fare is calculated as the equivalent variation in terms of the percent increase in annual consumption an agent would
require in the FRM economy to be indifferent between being born in a random period in the indicated economy
instead of the FRM economy.
return to in the next section.
5.4 Interest Rate Movement Orthogonal To The State of the Economy
In our main analysis, we have assumed that interest rates vary with economic fundamentals. There
are many reasons why this may not be the case; most importantly, inflation may move real rates
and create an output-inflation tradeoff for the central bank that precludes dropping rates in a crisis.
Importantly, this may affect the relative benefits of FRM and ARM because FRM would insure
against interest rate risk, while ARM would expose households to interest rate risk. To evaluate
this quantitatively, in this section we introduce movements in interest rates orthogonal to the state
of the economy.
To do so while remaining as close to the original calibration as possible, we generalize the
aggregate state Θt to have 10 values instead of 5. As before, there is a crisis state with tight credit,
a recession state with either tight or loose credit, and an expansion state with either tight or loose
credit. However, all five states may have high or low short interest rates, with an independent and
identically distributed 50 percent probability of being in the high or low interest rate state. We
assume that the interest rates in the high interest rate state are ∆/2 above our baseline calibration
rates, while the interest rates in the low interest rate state are ∆/2 below our baseline calibration
rates. ∆ is thus the rate difference between interest rates in the high and low states. Rather than
taking a stand on ∆, we vary ∆ and report results for ARM and FRM. To create a comparison to
our baseline results that is as clear as possible, we maintain our original calibration throughout, so
the models with orthogonal rate risk do not match our internal calibration targets.
Table 5.4 shows moments of price, consumption, and default as well as the increase in household
equivalent welfare for FRM relative to ARM for ∆ = 0% (baseline), ∆ = 0.5%, ∆ = 1.0%, and
∆ = 1.5%. The Table shows that adding variation in interest rates orthogonal to the state of
the economy reduces the unconditional household welfare benefits of the ARM. This is because the
FRM provides insurance against variation in interest rates, while the ARM exposes the household to
interest rate risk. As the Table shows, in equilibrium households behave to smooth the consumption
risk, and so this additional risk mostly shows up in higher default and higher volatility of default
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Table 5: Moments From Stochastic Simulations With Different Amounts of Interest Rate Movement
Orthogonal To The State of the Economy
∆ 0% (Baseline) 0.5% 1.0% 1.5%
Std Dev of Price Rel to FRM 98.6% 97.3% 97.9% 97.9%
St Dev of Default Rate Rel to FRM 78.6% 76.8% 77.3% 78.8%
Mean Default Rate Rel to FRM 95.9% 95.9% 96.5% 97.9%
St Dev of Agg Consumption Rel to FRM 95.4% 94.6% 95.1% 95.1%
Mean of Agg Consumption Rel to FRM 99.9% 99.8% 99.8% 99.8%
Increase in ARM Unconditional 0.12% 0.05% 0.04% 0.00%
Household Welfare Rel to FRM
Notes: Each cell shows ARM as a percentage of FRM for the statistic indicated by each row under the amount of
orthogonal interest rate movement indicated in each column. In particular, ∆ is the gap between interest rates in the
high interest rate state and the low interest rate state, with the midpoint corresponding to our baseline calibration.
There is an iid 50 percent chance of being in the high or low state. Price, default, and aggregate consumption are
calculated from aggregate 19,000 year simulations. Household welfare is calculated as the equivalent variation in
terms of the percent increase in annual consumption an agent would require in the FRM economy to be indifferent
between being born in a random period in the indicated economy instead of the FRM economy.
as ∆ rises. The additional interest rate risk causes the unconditional household welfare gain of
switching from FRM to ARM to decline as ∆ rises to the point that the unconditional welfare
benefits of ARM are completely eliminated with ∆ = 1.5% basis points. Given that the real short
rate drops 3.0% in a crisis, these results show that a large amount of orthogonal rate variation is
necessary to eliminate the unconditional benefits of ARMs.
6 Evaluating New Mortgage Designs
We have so far focused on comparing ARMs and FRMs to clearly elucidate the insurance benefits
of indexation. However, ARMs have some drawbacks. In particular, if the central bank raises
interest rates to fight an inflationary recession, our assumption that in recessions short rates fall
may be violated. In these cases, ARMs are worse from an insurance perspective, the reverse of our
main results because the covariance of interest rates and income shocks switches sign. We show
this quantitatively in Section 7. Furthermore, by revealed preference, most Americans prefer fixed
rate mortgages, which on average account for roughly 80 percent of mortgage originations.
Given these downsides, in this section we evaluate several mortgage designs that allow for state
contingency in a crisis while preserving the benefits of FRMs in normal times. We also evaluate
a contract that provides more idiosyncratic insurance than a standard ARM. Our main finding is
that mortgage designs that front-load payment relief in the crisis outperform mortgages that spread
payment relief over the life of the mortgage, even though the impact on lender balance sheets during
the crisis is similar.
6.1 Eberly-Krishnamurthy Convertible Mortgage
Eberly and Krishnamurthy (2014) propose a fixed-rate mortgage that can at any time be costlessly
converted to an adjustable-rate mortgage, but not back. This is similar to an economy in which
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Figure 10: Eberly-Krishnamurthy Convertible Mortgage: Housing Market Outcomes














































































































The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under FRM and
the Eberly-Krishnamurthy convertible mortgage both ex ante and ex post . In the downturn, the maximum LTV falls from 95
percent to 80 percent and the economy falls into a deep downturn for an average of 5.66 years.
one can choose between ARM and FRM with two important distinctions. First, homeowners who
do not satisfy the LTV constraint can still switch to an ARM. Since in our simulated crisis 70
percent of homeowners have under 20 percent equity at the beginning of the crisis, this is likely to
be significant. Second, homeowners who are so highly constrained that they cannot afford to pay
the fixed costs of refinancing can convert to an ARM costlessly. We introduce an EK mortgage
into our model by adding an additional agent-specific state that indicates whether an agent has
a mortgage functioning as an ARM or as an FRM and allowing agents to choose to convert their
loan from an FRM to an ARM but not back.43 New mortgages always start as an FRM, so one
can always obtain an FRM by refinancing. Otherwise, the model is unchanged.
This mortgage has two added benefits. First, introducing it in practice is likely to be less
disruptive, as it can act exactly like a FRM and does not take away the FRM option. Second, in
the event that the covariance of interest rates and monetary policy changes, it performs more like
an FRM, as we show in Section 7.
The convertible mortgage does, however, come at a cost, as borrowers will convert to an ARM
when it is beneficial for them to do so and then refinance into a new loan that starts as an FRM
when this is no longer the case. This implies that lenders will take losses in crisis states in which
the SDF is high, which will drive up spreads. However, in our calibration this cost is small: The
EK convertible mortgage on average has a 6 basis point higher spread over the riskless 10-year
bond rate than an FRM.44 The increase in the spread is quantitatively small because there is an
43There are five equations to price the EK mortgage but ten rates: An FRM rate and an ARM spread for each
state. One must thus make a further assumption about the relationship between the FRM rate and ARM spread. We
assume that when converted to ARM, the EK mortgage has the same spread over the short rate as the EK mortgage
acting as an FRM has over the 10-year risk-free bond rate in the model.
44The average spread is are calculated as an average of the spread for originating in each state weighted by the
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offsetting effect of reduced losses due to default in crisis states.
Figure 10 shows a simulated downturn under the convertible mortgage. The crisis is roughly 80
percent of the way to the all-ARM economy and realizes many of the consumption-smoothing and
macroprudential benefits of ARMs. This is the case because on average the share of mortgages that
are functioning as ARMs rises from under 10 percent pre crisis to near 100 percent during the crisis
as households who need the payments relief the most convert. The convertible mortgage does not
look fully like an ARM because of the higher spread. Table 4 compares the Eberly-Krishnamurthy
mortgage with an FRM in stochastic simulations and also finds it is most of the way to the ARM
economy. The unconditional household welfare benefits of EK relative to FRM are 0.07% of annual
consumption, 60% of the welfare gain of ARM.
6.2 Fixed Rate Mortgage With an Underwater Refinancing Option
The second mortgage that we consider is a fixed-rate mortgage that has a built-in underwater
refinance option (FRMUR), which can be exercised even if the origination LTV constraint is no
longer satisfied.45 We introduce this in our model by adding an additional agent-specific state that
indicates whether an agent has exercised the built-in refinance option. We assume the structure is
such that the option can only be exercised in the crisis state.
FRMUR acts like an FRM except it directly addresses the issue of not being able to refinance
when one is underwater. Because payments fall in bad states, it helps smooth consumption and
reduce default losses for lenders. Of course, the option itself is costly for lenders. On net, in our
model, the FRM with an underwater refinancing option has a 0.7 basis point higher spread than an
FRM. Again, there are two offsetting effects: lenders provide insurance to underwater households
who take advantage of the underwater refinancing option during the crisis which pushes spreads
up, but there is less default in equilibrium which pushes down spreads.
Figure 11 shows the crisis under FRMs with an underwater refinancing option. The FRMUR
is priced off the long end of the yield curve, which falls less than the short end in a crisis. Because
the insurance it provides is minimal, consumption is roughly the same as FRMs in the crisis.
The initial decline in prices is 0.45 percentage points smaller, only 7.9% fewer households default,
and consumption only rises by 0.05 percentage points. All of these figures are far smaller than
under the EK mortgage. In stochastic simulations, the FRMUR option behaves much like an
FRM with slightly lower default volatility and has only a 0.02% household welfare gain relative
to FRM, as shown in Table 4. Overall, allowing for underwater refinancing provides some limited
macroprudential benefits in a crisis but only limited consumption-smoothing benefits because the
share of loans originating in each state.
45We model this mortgage as an FRM with a built-in option to convert to a new FRM. Upon exercise of the
option, the homeowner continues to pay the same spread over the 10-year bond rate as at origination but instead
over the current 10-year risk-free bond rate, which the household locks in for the remainder of the mortgage. Since
the 10-year bond rate falls during the crisis, the borrower has a lower minimum payment. These choices put the
FRMUR mortgage on an equal footing with the EK mortgage in the sense that the original lender prices the built-in
option to refinance into the pre-crisis mortgage rate. If we were to require that a new lender take on the additional
risk through refinancing, the FRMUR would look worse because rates would rise in the crisis as borrowers with a
high risk of default would refinance. With higher rates in the crisis, the payment relief from being able to refinance
would be reduced. See the Appendix for a quantitative comparison.
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Figure 11: FRM With an Underwater Refinancing Option: Housing Market Outcomes














































































































The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under FRM and
the FRM with underwater refinancing both ex ante and ex post . In the downturn, the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to
80 percent and the economy falls into a deep downturn for an average of 5.66 years.
FRM is priced off the long end of the yield curve. The fact that FRMUR affects prices, default, and
consumption so little reveals that most of the benefits of ARMs are due to the yield curve channel
rather than the underwater homeowner channel, which, while active, is quantitatively weak in our
baseline model.
The comparison of the Eberly-Krishnamurthy convertible mortgage and the FRM with an
underwater refinancing option provides the clearest contrast for our central finding: It is best to
“front load” payment relief so that it is concentrated in a crisis. Both the EK and FRMUR provide
insurance to underwater borrowers, however the EK front loads the relief by delivering maximal
relief in a recession while the FRMUR gives households a new lower fixed rate that they keep for
longer, thereby spreading the payment relief over the length of the mortgage. From the perspective
of a lender entering the crisis state, these two mortgages are quite similar. Indeed, the present value
of outstanding mortgages falls by 2.62 percent upon entering the crisis under FRMUR and by 2.52
percent under EK. However, the convertible mortgage helps liquidity constrained households in the
crisis by three times as much and stems the tide of default and the price-default spiral. It also
makes buying much more affordable for new homeowners, helping put a floor under house prices.
The convertible mortgage does hit household balance sheets more when rates rise, but by then
the macroeconomy and housing market have stabilized, and house prices have recovered so that
most households can refinance back into a new mortgage that initially functions as an FRM if they
so choose. Consequently, designs that front-load the benefits of rate reductions so that they are
concentrated in recessions do best.
One aspect of refinancing that this analysis misses is the ability of underwater homeowners
to extend their mortgage, as all mortgages amortize over the remaining lifetime of the borrower.
For, example, refinancing a loan that amortizes over 10 remaining years into a 30 year loan would
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substantially lower monthly payments, even if the loans are at the same interest rate and have the
same principal (Lucas et al., 2011). Since the key issue during the crisis is liquidity, our analysis
shows that such a reduction in payments could deliver benefits. However, there are a few important
caveats. First, we have shown that the benefits are largest when payment reductions are front-
loaded, and extending an FRM’s term reduces payments over the remaining life of the mortgage
rather than front-loading them. Moreover, the benefits of obtaining a new 30-year mortgage depend
on how many years the borrower has left on her current mortgage. The households most at risk
of default and in need of liquidity in the model are largely young households who have recently
purchased a home and for whom the term extension would have a small impact, as their existing
mortgage is already a relatively long-term mortgage. Indeed, in Agarwal et al.’s (2017b) analysis
of the HARP program, the average refinanced loan under HARP received a term extension of only
4.7 years. Since little principal is paid down in the first several years of the loan, this implies that
over three quarters of the payment relief from HARP came from rate reductions and less than one
quarter from principal reductions.
Finally, the FRMUR is similar to ex post policies that refinance borrowers who are underwater,
such as the Home Affordable Refinance Program pursued in the Great Recession. However, the
HARP program occurred at least in part while the Federal Reserve pursued quantitative easing,
and Agarwal et al. (2017b) report that the average HARP borrower experienced a 1.4 percent
reduction in their mortgage rate, while in our baseline calibration the reduction is 0.62 percent.
We show how FRMUR interacts with quantitative easing in Section 7.2.
6.3 Option ARM
We now consider a mortgage design that takes maximal advantage of front-loading benefits, an
option ARM. This is an ARM mortgage that became popular in the early 2000s boom allowing the
borrower to make one of three payments: a fully amortizing payment, an interest only payment, and
a potentially negatively amortizing payment equal to the minimum payment based on the interest
rate at origination. The negative amortization is allowed up to a ceiling, and after several years,
the option ARM converts to a fully amortizing ARM. The key feature of the option ARM is the
ability to delay payments, which is potentially beneficial to a homeowner in a crisis. Piskorski and
Tchistyi’s (2010) theoretical analysis of mortgage contracts with exogenous house prices highlights
the benefits of an option ARM.
Note that relative to the contracts we have considered thus far, the option ARM allows the
payment reduction to be a function of the borrower’s idiosyncratic state and not just the aggregate
state. In other words, a borrower who receives a negative income shock in an expansion state
can choose to defer payments. The ARM or the EK contract only allow for reduced payments in
recession or crisis states when interest rates are low. Thus our analysis of the option ARM also
captures the benefits of mortgage contracts whose payments can be indexed to idiosyncratic states.
To introduce the option ARM in our model, we assume that the mortgage behaves like a normal
ARM for households in the last 25 years of their life. However, households in the first 20 years
of life are able to choose a mortgage balance next period equal to the maximum of their current
balance and the maximum balance allowed under the LTV constraint φ in the period in which they
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Figure 12: Option ARM: Housing Market Outcomes
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The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under FRM, the
option ARM mortgage, and an FRM→OARM counterfactual. In the downturn, the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80
percent and the economy falls into a deep downturn for an average of 5.66 years.
took out their mortgage given today’s price. This allows for some negative amortization up to a
ceiling defined by φ, and makes it so that households are not forced to pay down principal when
the LTV constraint tightens at the beginning of the crisis.
Figure 12 compares the crisis under FRM and the option ARM. Under the option ARM, as
prices fall by 6.10 percentage points rather than 2.24 percentage points under ARM. The decline in
aggregate consumption is also 1.81 percentage points smaller than FRM rather than 0.79 percentage
points under ARM. However, there is more default than under ARM.
The option ARM is successful because in addition to indexing payments to the short rate as with
a standard ARM, it delivers additional front-loaded relief by allowing homeowners to negatively
amortize up to a cap during the crisis and defer mortgage payments until after the crisis. There is an
offsetting effect because homeowners understand the additional insurance benefits the option ARM
design provides and they take on more leverage when purchasing a home. Some also take advantage
of the negative amortization option before the crisis to deal with an idiosyncratic shock. This
implies that households hold fewer liquid assets and have higher LTV ratios in non-crisis periods
relative to an economy with a standard ARM, which creates macro fragility that undoes some of
the benefits of the option ARM when the crisis hits. To illustrate this, Figure 12 shows in dashed
lines an FRM→OARM counterfactual that preserves the pre-crisis distribution of individuals across
states from the FRM model by switching the economy from FRM to OARM by surprise when the
crisis hits, as with the FRM→ARM counterfactual in Section 5.1. One can see that absent the
endogenous increase in leverage and decrease in liquid asset holdings at the beginning of the crisis
under OARM, the price and consumption declines would have been ameliorated even more, and the
default rate would have been much lower under the option ARM. Indeed, the fact that the option
ARM preforms worse than the ARM for default is due entirely to the rightward shift in the LTV
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distribution and reduction in liquid asset holdings.
It is also worthwhile to note that the option ARM provides substantially higher unconditional
household welfare benefits than the other mortgage designs, as reported in Table 4. This once again
is intuitive. The other mortgage designs only provide state-contingent insurance against aggregate
shocks, since changes in interest rates are tied to aggregate movements in the economy. However,
households are exposed to substantial idiosyncratic risks. Unlike the other mortgage designs, the
option ARM provides for insurance against such shocks because young households can negatively
amortize in response to a purely idiosyncratic income shock.
These latter observations also hint at the Achilles’ heel of the option ARM (or any similar
contract with insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks). In a model with heterogeneity in
types in which some households have low default utility costs and others have high default costs,
the option ARM will attract types with low default costs who will take the mortgage, continually
delay payments, and eventually default. Such behavior will raise the cost of the option ARM and
even unravel the market so that there is little insurance benefit from the contract. On the other
hand, with the EK mortgage or a regular ARM, the ability to delay payments is contingent on the
aggregate state, which is less subject to gaming. Our purpose in studying the option-ARM is not
to identify it as the optimal design but simply to quantify the benefit of the additional insurance
it provides absent adverse selection concerns.
7 The Interaction of Mortgage Design and Monetary Policy
We now turn to examining how monetary policy interacts with mortgage design in a crisis. We
begin by comparing the polar opposite case from our main analysis in which the real interest rate
rises in a recession. We then turn to more aggressive monetary policy in a crisis both through more
aggressive short rate reductions and quantitative easing. Our model allows us to quantitatively
compare how different combinations of monetary policy and mortgage designs affect the economy.
This analysis highlights the value of studying mortgage design and monetary policy jointly.
7.1 Fighting Inflation: Rising Real Rates in a Crisis
In this subsection we consider a housing-led recession with substantial inflation that causes the
central bank to raise the real interest rate to contain inflationary pressures. One can think of this
as a combination of the housing bust in the Great Recession and the inflation experienced in the
1981-2 recession. To consider this case, we keep the same calibration but increase the real short
rate in a crisis to 5.6 percent, which is the average real rate in the 1981-2 recession instead of 0.26
percent.46 47 We call this the “Volcker monetary policy.”
46Combining the 2006-8 credit crunch with the 1981-2 recession results in rather extreme event, especially given
that the Federal Reserve may not have raised rates as much in the 1981-2 recession in an all-ARM economy. We
nonetheless evaluate this extreme event in order to stress-test our mortgage designs.
47Many ARMs have a ceiling on the amount that the interest rate can rise over the course of the loan. In this
counterfactual, we assume that there are no such ceilings. If there were, the increase in the ARM interest rate would
be smaller, but knowing this banks would increase the ex ante mortgage spread.
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Figure 13: Short Rate Rises in Crisis as in 1981-2 Recession














































































































Note: The figure shows the outcomes in a simulated downturn in which the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent
and there is a deep downturn lasting an average of 5.66 years under an FRM, ARM, EK, and FRMUR for the case where the
central bank raises the short rate to 5.6 percent, the average real rate in the 1981-2 recession, in crisis states. Monetary policy
in other states is unchanged.
Figure 13 shows ARM, FRM, and EK, in a simulated crisis under this alternate monetary policy.
FRMUR is not shown because it is indistinguishable from FRM when rates rise in a crisis. Because
the covariance of the short rate and income has the opposite sign from under the baseline monetary
policy, an ARM makes the household’s income stream net of mortgage payments more volatile and
leads to higher price volatility and default and lower consumption. Quantitatively, prices fall by
2.59 percentage points more under ARM, and 11.62 percent of the housing stock defaults over eight
years under ARM relative to 8.46 percent under FRM.
The EK convertible mortgage performs closer to an FRM under the Volcker monetary policy.
Prices fall by roughly the same amount peak to trough as FRM although they fall slightly more in
the first period, and the cumulative default rate over eight years is 9.17 percent. Most households
that take out a new mortgage or refinance do not convert their EK mortgage from fixed-rate to
adjustable-rate, and the ARM share at the beginning of the crisis is approximately 10 percent.
However, a few households convert their EK mortgage to adjustable-rate and do not refinance
into a new EK mortgage that begins as a fixed-rate prior to the crisis. Some of these households
experience an adverse income shock in the crisis, are underwater, and end up defaulting, which is
why default is slightly higher under EK. That being said, the crisis is nowhere near as severe as
under ARM because the vast majority of households have an EK mortgage that is functioning as a
FRM, which is why EK provides a nice balance of insuring against catastrophe in an inflationary
environment while providing insurance when real rates fall in a crisis. Indeed, the EK achieves
most of the gains of ARM under the baseline monetary policy but only a fraction of the downside
under an inflationary monetary policy.
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Figure 14: Monetary Policy: Short Rate Falls By More in Crisis














































































































Note: The figure shows in solid lines the outcomes in a simulated downturn in which the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent
to 80 percent and there is a deep downturn lasting an average of 5.66 years under an FRM and ARM or the case where the
central bank further reduces the short rate by 100 basis points relative to the baseline monetary policy. The baseline scenario
without the additional 100 basis point reduction is shown in dashed lines for comparison.
7.2 Additional Monetary Experiments
We now consider two modifications to the central bank’s baseline monetary policy. In the first
modification, we consider expansionary monetary policy in crisis states whereby the central bank
lowers the short rate and consequently ARM mortgage rates by an additional 100 basis points.
Long interest rates fall less since they adjust according to expectations-hypothesis-type logic. We
think of this as corresponding to more aggressive traditional monetary policy, with long rates still
governed by the lender SDF.
In the second modification, we assume that in addition to reducing the short rate an additional
100 basis points, in crisis states the central bank is able to further reduce long rates. This experiment
can be viewed through two lenses. There is evidence that long rates react more to monetary policy
shocks than might be expected under the expectations hypothesis. See, for example, Hanson and
Stein (2015). Thus with this experiment, we provide some sense of how more responsive long rates
alter our baseline conclusions. Alternatively, the Fed pursued quantitative easing in the crisis and
its aftermath due to hitting the zero lower bound on short rates, and its policy was directly targeted
at the long end of the yield curve and mortgage term premia. Thus our exercise can shed light on
the interaction between unconventional monetary policy and mortgage design.
We implement the movement in long-rates by assuming that the central bank reduces the
bank cost of capital for the FRM and FRMUR in the crisis state by enough so that interest rate
differential between the expansion with loose credit and crisis states for a risk-free 10-year bond
is 1.4 percent, which is the average reduction in interest rates for HARP borrowers reported by
Agarwal et al. (2017b). This requires a 208 basis point capital subsidy in the crisis state. An
alternative approach would be to model the SDF as depending on unconventional monetary policy,
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Figure 15: Monetary Policy: Further Reduction in Long Rates (QE)














































































































Note: The figure shows the outcomes in a simulated downturn in which the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent
and there is a five year deep downturn under an FRM and ARM, for the case where the central bank both further reduces the
short rate relative to the baseline monetary policy by 100 basis points and additionally pursues a policy that subsidizes the long
rate so that a 10-year risk-free bond has a 1.4% interest rate differential between the expansion and crisis states. The baseline
scenario without is shown in dashed lines for comparison.
but our investigations suggest that such an approach would substantially increase the complexity
of the model.
The results of the first modification, which reduces only short rates, are shown in Figure 14,
and key moments are summarized in the first two columns of Table 6. Traditional monetary policy
has very little impact on the severity of the crisis under FRM. While the return to saving in liquid
assets changes, the FRM interest rate does not change appreciably because FRMs are priced off
the long end of the yield curve. Since few households have liquid assets and most saving in the
economy is for retirement, housing demand by young households and the behavior of high-LTV
households that are primarily young is unchanged, and so the housing market equilibrium is not
substantially affected.
On the other hand, more aggressive monetary policy that affects short rates is useful when
homeowners have ARMs. Price declines and default are substantially lower and consumption is
slightly higher due to the more aggressive monetary policy. This is, of course, not surprising. Lower
short-rates leads to lower mortgage payments which leads to less default and a smaller price-default
spiral, and lower short rates also stimulate new homeowner demand more.
When the risk-free 10-year long rate falls 1.4 percent in the crisis relative to an expansion, due
either to a more responsive term premium or unconventional monetary policy such as QE, the
FRM economy performs better than under the baseline monetary policy, as shown in Figure 15 and
summarized in the last three columns of Table 6. Prices fall by 1.29 percentage points less than
with FRM under the baseline monetary policy, and 7.35 percent of the housing stock defaults over
eight years instead of 8.00 percent. These figures are an improvement but still fall short of the ARM
under the baseline monetary policy. As with the ARM, new homeowners can now lock in cheap
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Figure 16: Monetary Policy: FRM With Underwater Refi Option With and Without QE


















































































































Note: The figure shows the outcomes in a simulated downturn in which the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent
and there is a five year deep downturn under an FRM with an underwater refinancing option for the baseline monetary policy
and for the case where the central bank both further reduces the short rate relative to the baseline monetary policy by 100
basis points and additionally pursues a policy that subsidizes the long rate so that a 10-year risk-free bond has a 1.40% interest
rate differential between the expansion and crisis states.
financing, which stimulates demand for housing and boosts house prices. However, there is still
limited passthrough of the lower rates to existing homeowners due to refinancing constraints, which
keeps the default rate high. Thus while a more responsive term premium or forms of unconventional
monetary policy which push down long rates mitigates the differences between the FRM and ARM
economies, they do not resolve them.
This suggests that ex post policies such as HARP or the FRMUR mortgage design, which resolve
the underwater refinancing frictions, may be quite effective when combined with monetary policies
that push down long rates, such as QE.48 This can be seen in two ways. First, Figure 16 compares
the FRM with underwater refinancing under the baseline policy and the more aggressive short rate
policy coupled with quantitative easing to generate a 1.4 percent drop in the risk-free 10-year long
rate – and thus a 1.4 percent decline in the FRM rate for homeowners who exercise their refinancing
option that is tied to this rate – in the crisis. Prices fall by 1.88 percentage points less than the
baseline policy, consumption falls 0.43 percentage points less, and the default rate is 6.17 percent
over eight years rather than 7.37 percent. Second, one can compare how much of an improvement
FRMUR is over FRM under the baseline monetary policy (Table 3) and the monetary policy with
a more-responsive term premium (Table 6). With a more responsive term premium, there is now
a more significant difference between the FRM and FRMUR designs. Whereas under the baseline
policy FRMUR caused prices to fall 0.45 percentage points less, consumption to fall 0.05 percentage
points less, and default to decline by 0.63 percentage points more than under FRM, with a more-
responsive term premium, prices fall 1.04 percentage points less, consumption falls 0.28 percentage
48Our results here are related to those in Beraja et al. (2019), who in a more stylized model with a fixed mortgage
design show that HARP is more effective with monetary policies like QE.
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Table 6: Downturn Moments Under Short Rate and More Response Term Premium Policies
Design FRM ARM FRM ARM FRMUR
Monetary Policy Short Rate Short Rate + Term Premium/QE
Pct Point Change in Max ∆P Rel to FRM 7.05 6.00 1.04
Pct Point Change in Max ∆C Rel to FRM 1.62 1.48 0.28
Share Defaulting over 8 Years 7.87% 4.63% 7.35% 4.63% 6.17%
Note: Table shows the indicated statistics for each mortgage design averaging across 100 simulations of a crisis that lasts
5.66 years after an expansion with loose credit as described in the main text. under two monetary policies. The first policy
reduces the short rate relative to the baseline monetary policy by 100 basis points and lets the long rate adjust according
to expectations-hypothesis-type logic, but discounting according to the lender SDF. The second policy reduces the short rate
relative to the baseline monetary policy by 100 basis points and additionally pursues a policy that subsidizes the long rate so
that a 10-year risk-free bond has a 1.40% interest rate differential between the expansion and crisis states. The top row shows
the percentage point change in the peak to trough change in price relative to FRM, with a positive number indicating a less
severe price decline. The second row shows the percentage point change in the peak to trough change in consumption relative
to FRM, with a positive number indicating a less severe decline in consumption. The third row shows the share of the housing
stock defaulting after 8 years.
points less, and default declines 1.18 percentage points more than under FRM. The FRMUR design,
coupled with a more responsive term premium, provides significant liquidity relief to constrained
households, and furthermore, allows them to take advantage of it. Furthermore, this exercise shows
resolving the underwater refinancing frictions becomes more important as the amount of liquidity
relief available increases.
8 Conclusion
We assess how mortgages can be redesigned or modified in a crisis to reduce housing market
volatility, consumption volatility, and default and how mortgage design interacts with monetary
policy. To do so, we construct a quantitative equilibrium life cycle model with aggregate shocks in
which households have realistic long-term mortgages that are priced by risk-neutral and competitive
lenders and household decisions aggregate up to determine house prices. We calibrate the model to
match aggregate moments as well as quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of payment size and
LTV on default so that our model is tailored to qualitatively assess the benefits of adding simple
state contingency to mortgage contracts.
We use the model to assess the performance of various mortgage contracts in a realistic,
recession-driven housing crisis. In our model, indexing payments to monetary policy significantly
reduces household consumption volatility and default. If the central bank reduces interest rates in
response to the crisis, mortgage payments fall both by more and regardless of whether a household
refinances, which helps to smooth consumption, limits default by relaxing budget constraints in bad
states, and stimulates housing demand by new homeowners. These hedging benefits are quite large
for constrained, high LTV households who bear the brunt of the housing bust. Quantitatively,
under ARM relative to FRM house prices fall by 2.24 percentage points less, 23 percent fewer
households default, consumption falls by 0.79 percentage points less. These benefits depend on
the extent to which the insurance provided by ARMs is anticipated by households, as households
take on more debt and hold fewer liquid assets when they expect their payments to fall in a crisis,
leading to more macro fragility.
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Our main conclusion is that mortgages that front-load payment relief provide much better
outcomes for households and can substantially improve household welfare. Reducing monthly
payments in a crisis alleviates liquidity constraints when they are most binding, limits default, and
stimulates housing demand by renters, which stems house price declines and ameliorates pecuniary
externalities that work through the price of housing. The clearest example of the benefits of front-
loading payment reductions comes from our comparison of a FRM with an option to convert to
an an ARM to an FRM with an option to refinance underwater. Although both mortgages have
similar effects on the balance sheets of lenders when a crisis hits, the EK convertible mortgage
front-loads payment reductions during the crisis, which makes it far more successful at stabilizing
prices, consumption, and default. The FRMUR does worse because it is priced off the long end
of the yield curve and thus smooths payment relief over the life of the loan, providing households
payment relief in states where they need it less.
While the comparison of these two loans gives the starkest contrast, there are a number of
different ways in which one might front-load payment relief. We consider quantitatively the option
ARM, which allows households to insure idiosyncratic shocks. One might also consider an ARM
with a cap or an FRM or ARM that can have its payments cut in a recession through term extension.
We leave the analysis of the best way to front-load payment relief for future research.
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A Numerical Implementation
We solve the model numerically by discretizing the state space. Because the aggregate state Θt has
five values, we use five values for the interest rate. We use seven grid points for income. We use 22
grid points for savings, with a denser grid at low savings. We use 41 grid points for the mortgage
balance, with two balances for renters (with and without the default flag), and 39 values for the
mortgage including zero. The grid is denser for higher balances that are close to the equilibrium
price given that amortization schedules feature smaller principal payments earlier in the mortgage.
Finally, we use eight equally-spaced grid points for the house price and interpolate on the price grid
when the price falls between grid points. We have experimented with finer grids and have found
the results are not sensitive to the grids we choose.
We solve the household’s problem by backward induction, starting with an initial guess for the
mortgage spreads and the forecast rules. We then simulate 19,000 years of data and throw out
the first 100 years. In each period of the simulation, a new generation is born and shocks hit the
economy. We then calculate the supply and demand schedules, calculate the equilibrium price,
and finally update the distribution of individuals across states according to the policy functions,
interpolating between price grid points.
We then follow the Krusell and Smith-style algorithm described in the main text. We run
forecast rule regressions:
log pt+1 = f(Θt,Θt+1) (log pt)
where f(Θt,Θt+1) is a function for each realization of (Θt,Θt+1). Because Θt has five values, there
are potentially 25 forecast rules, but 12 relate to (Θt,Θt+1) transitions that do not occur in practice
(e.g., one only transitions to the tight credit state after a crisis) so there are only 13 forecast rules
that must converge. With orthogonal interest rate movement, there are 52 (the same 13 for high-
high, high-low, low-high, and low-low rates). We parameterize f (·) as a linear spline with knot
points located at the price grid points. After running the regressions on the simulated data, we
update the forecast rules to a convex combination of the original forecast rules and the regressions.49
We also solve for the equilibrium spreads given κ and update the spreads to a convex combination
of the original forecast spreads and the new zero profit spreads. We iterate until the forecast
rules and spreads converge. Three criteria must be simultaneously met for convergence. First,
the spread must be within one basis point of the actual break-even spread. Second, the forecast
rule R-squareds must converge so that the difference is less than 0.0025 between iterations. Third,
for all forecast rules, the distance between the regression and the forecast rule must be less than
0.005 at all prices for which we observe data in our 19,000-period simulation. In practice, the third
criterion is the most stringent, and our spreads and forecast rules are highly accurate as described
below.
For the FRM in the baseline calibration, we must solve for the κ that implies that the average
spread between the spread in the model and a 10-year bond is 1.65 percent as in the data. For this,
we follow a similar algorithm to the one described above, but in addition to adjusting the spread
49One could in principle simply use the regression as the new forecast rule, but we have found that this leads to
oscillating behavior. We consequently use a convex combination which, while slower, provides better convergence
properties.
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Table 7: Den Haan Tests: R2 Of Predicted vs. Actual Price N Years Ahead
R2 Over Horizon: 15 Years 30 Years 45 Years 100 Years
Baseline, FRM 95.22% 95.06% 95.08% 95.10%
Baseline, ARM 93.80% 93.78% 93.88% 93.88%
Baseline, EK 93.47% 93.32% 93.42% 93.43%
Baseline, FRMUR 94.86% 94.71% 94.74% 94.77%
Baseline, OARM 92.48% 92.40% 92.52% 92.47%
Volcker, FRM 95.65% 95.58% 95.65% 95.66%
Volcker, ARM 95.20% 95.32% 95.48% 95.55%
Volcker, EK 94.98% 95.08% 95.22% 95.27%
Volcker, FRMUR 95.67% 95.61% 95.57% 95.68%
Volcker, OARM 93.19% 93.24% 93.43% 93.48%
Short Rate Only, FRM 95.12% 94.96% 94.99% 95.00%
Short Rate Only, ARM 92.19% 92.13% 92.32% 92.33%
QE, FRM 94.71% 94.52% 94.55% 94.55%
QE, ARM 92.19% 92.13% 92.32% 92.33%
QE, FRMUR 94.19% 94.03% 94.07% 94.07%
Note: The table shows the R2 of a regression of the forecast price on the actual price 15, 30, 45, and 100 years ahead. To
create the table, for each period of the simulation we calculate the expected price based on the realized price N periods ago,
the forecast rule, and the realized sequence of aggregate states in the intervening N years. We then regress the actual price on
the predicted price and report the R2.
and forecast rules, we adjust κ to hit the 1.65 percent average spread between the 10 year mortgage
and a synthetic 10-year bond rate calculated according to the lender SDF. κ converges along with
the spreads.
To assess the accuracy of the forecast rules, we follow Den Haan (2010) and calculate the
predicted price using the realized shocks 15, 30, 45, and 100 years into the future and compare the
realized price to the predicted price. Table 7 shows the results for each of the models we consider
in the paper. The R2 ranges from 92% to 96%, indicating the forecast rules are accurate and that
errors do not accumulate over longer horizons. Figure 7 shows the scatter plot of the predicted
versus the actual price at each horizon for FRM.
In the text, we report results from three exercises. In the first, we report unconditional aggregate
statistics from simulations of 19,000 years of data.
In the second exercise, we report the volatility of consumption at the individual level. To do
so, we track 25,000 individuals per generation for 6,300 years and report the standard deviation of
consumption. We conduct a standard variance decomposition that divides individual consumption
into the variance of aggregate consumption across periods, the variance of generational average
consumption within periods, and the variance of individual consumption across generations.
In the third exercise, we calculate the impulse response of our economy to a crisis. We run 100
simulations in which we seed the economy to be in a loose credit expansion for the last 5 periods.
We then seed the economy to be in a crisis for at least 3 periods, after which is stochastically exits.
We average over the 100 simulations to obtain the impulse response. In doing so, we also calculate
the impact of the initial switch into the crisis state on the present value of the bank’s portfolio.
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Figure 17: Den Haan Tests: Scatter Of Predicted vs. Actual Price N Years Ahead For FRM



















Price vs. Den Haan 15 year Prediction



















Price vs. Den Haan 30 year Prediction



















Price vs. Den Haan 45 year Prediction



















Price vs. Den Haan 100 year Prediction
Note: The figure shows a scatter plot of the forecast price 15, 30, 45, and 100 years ahead versus the actual price. To create
the figure, for each period of the simulation we calculate the expected price based on the realized price N periods ago, the
forecast rule, and the realized sequence of aggregate states in the intervening N years.
B Household Welfare
As discussed in the main text, our approach to welfare is to calculate it for the households ignoring
the lenders. This is because we abstract from explicitly modeling the lenders and instead calibrate
a lender SDF using options data, and so we cannot calculate lender welfare. We do, however, report
the present value loss to lenders (using their SDF) in a crisis, and our pricing implies that lenders
break even according to their lender SDF on average. Our welfare approach also neglects any social
costs of foreclosure, as we detail in the main text.
The value function in our model for an age a individual at time t in idiosyncratic state stj and





















where ct is consumption at time t, b is the bequest at time T , Ht is housing at time t, and Defaultt
is an indicator for default at time t. Define the value function under two different economies 0 and
1 as V a,0t and V
a,1
t .





. We calculate the household welfare change as equivalent variation, that is the amount
consumption would have to increase by in economy 0 to make the agent indifferent between economy



















































































We report two distinct household welfare calculations. The first is unconditional welfare. This
is defined as the consumption-equivalent equivalent variation of being born in economy 0 relative
to economy 1. Because we are using equivalent variation, we use the ergodic distribution for the
initial generation over both micro and macro states in the 0 economy, which we denote by ω0,
to weight the value functions in the 0 economy and the 1 economy. The aggregate unconditional








The second household welfare calculation is conditional welfare, which corresponds to the ag-
gregate welfare loss experienced when the economy switches from a loose-credit expansion to the
crisis state. We follow Krueger et al. (2016) in calculating the welfare losses from a switch in the
aggregate state as “the permanent percentage increase in consumption that a...household would
require so that its welfare in the transition is the same as the welfare when the transition does not
happen.” Given this, we can define the consumption-equivalent equivalent variation welfare change
for a household with idiosyncratic state sjt of going from aggregate state Σ
0


































We report results aggregating up conditional welfare across age groups. We do this because
different cohorts have different remaining lives, so one cannot compare ∆ easily across age groups.
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The concept we use to aggregate is also from Krueger et al.: “Suppose households are randomly
placed into the pre-recession cross-sectional distribution over individual characteristics. Under the
veil of ignorance of not knowing where in the distribution one would be placed, we ask by what
percentage would lifetime consumption of everyone need to be increased to be compensated from
the loss of falling into a recession.” Define Ωat as the distribution of households of age a across



















This appendix details the calibration of the income process.
Our first task is to create a discretized income process with left skewness in busts. We assume
that the income process of Floden and Linde (2001) holds in an expansion and add left skewness
in a recession to match the left skewness observed in 2008-9 by Guvenen et al. (2014). We then
discretize the resulting distribution using the method of Farmer and Today (2017) modified slightly
to discretize two idiosyncratic shock distributions on the same grid. Because there are multiple
ways to add this amount of left skewness, we need an additional moment to match. In particular, we
match the standard deviation of aggregate log income of 0.0215. Finally, we adjust the distribution
of initial income for incoming distributions to best match the lifecycle profile of income in Guvenen
et al. (2019) and adjust the aggregate income level so that we obtain an average income of one.
We now describe how we implement this procedure in detail. Our first step is to create a
mixture of normals to target in the Farmer and Toda (2017) procedure. We assume that the
distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is the same in expansions regardless of whether credit is loose
or tight. Similarly, the distribution of idiosyncratic shock is the same in recessions and crises, again
regardless of whether credit is loose or tight. In expansions, we use the income process of Floden
and Linde (2001), which is an AR(1) process with a standard deviation of 0.21 log points and an
annual persistence of 0.91. In a crisis or recession, we add the standardized skewness of the 2008-9
income change distribution from Guvenen et al. (2014) to the mixture of normals. To do this, we
fit a mixture of normals to the histogram underlying Figure 12 in Guvenen et al. (2014). We then
calculate the standardized skewness of this distribution. We then adjust the Floden and Linde
(2001) income process by adding mass to the left tail to match the same standardized skewness we
found in the Guvenen et al. data.
With these mixtures of normals in hand, we then adjust three parameters to target three
moments: the standard deviation of aggregate log income, the fit between the model and data age-
income profiles, and an aggregate income of one. We adjust three parameters in a minimum distance
routine. First, we shift the mean of the bust idiosyncratic shock distribution, which allows us to
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target the standard deviation of log income in the data. Second, we adjust fraction of the population
that starts at each initial income which allows us to target the age-income profile. Third, we adjust
the level of the aggregate income vector yagg, which allows us to target an average income of one.
For each vector of parameters, we apply a modified version of the Farmer and Toda (2017) algorithm
using code from Toda’s website. The modification is to calculate the idiosyncratic income grid using
only the boom distribution and then discretizing both the boom and bust distributions on the same
grid. Given the left skewness, we use a grid with grid-points spaced from 2.5 standard deviations
below the mean to 1.5 standard deviations above the mean. After discretizing, we simulate income,
generate simulated data and calculate the average aggregate income, the standard deviation of log
income, and the mean squared error between the age-income profile in the data and the model, and
then search over the parameter space to find the optimal. We match the standard deviation of log
income and aggregate income nearly exactly, and the fit to the age-income profile is close as shown
in Figure 18.
We obtain from this calibration procedure four objects objects: a transition matrix that is a
function of the aggregate state Ξid (Θt), a vector y
agg (Θt) which gives log aggregate income as a
function of the aggregate state, a log idiosyncratic income vector yid for non-retirement (and im-
plicitly a log idiosyncratic income vector for retirement that is equal to yid−0.35 by our assumption
of a 0.35 log point income decline in retirement), and an entrant distribution over the idiosyncratic
states. Recall that we discretize to seven idiosyncratic incomes and have five aggregate states. For
these vectors and matrices, we let state 1 be the crisis, state 2 be a recession with loose credit,
state 3 be an expansion with loose credit, state 4 be a recession with tight credit, and state 5 be
an expansion with tight credit.









We calibrate so that aggregate income falls by 8.0 percent in a crisis and 3.5 percent in a recession,
so this is just a normalization of the resulting vector ensuring that aggregate income is on average
equal to one.











The distribution of entrants has 92.69 percent weight on the second to bottom grid point and 7.31
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percent weight on the third to bottom grid point.
By assumption, the idiosyncratic income distribution is the same in the crisis state, the recession
state with loose credit, and the recession state with tight credit. It is equal to:
Ξid (Crisis or Recession) =

0.8183 0.1593 0.0103 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0116
0.1820 0.5046 0.2847 0.0279 0.0007 0.0001 0
0.0563 0.0783 0.6038 0.2611 0.0005 0 0
0.0123 0.0209 0.1493 0.6123 0.2011 0.0041 0
0.0021 0.0091 0.0227 0.1939 0.6093 0.1595 0.0034
0.0001 0.0019 0.0099 0.0268 0.2391 0.5904 0.1318
0.0033 0.0049 0.0067 0.0083 0.0140 0.1648 0.7980

In this matrix, the probability listed is the probability of a transition from the row i to the column
j, so that rows add to a probability of one. By assumption, the idiosyncratic income distribution
is the same in the expansion state regardless of the state of credit and is equal to:
Ξid (Expandsion) =

0.7059 0.2663 0.0235 0.0005 0 0 0.0038
0.0911 0.5794 0.3204 0.0091 0 0 0
0.0021 0.1138 0.6156 0.26116 0.0069 0 0
0 0.0030 0.1478 0.6327 0.2116 0.0049 0
0 0 0.0042 0.1887 0.6361 0.1674 0.0036
0 0 0 0.0032 0.2462 0.6104 0.1402
0.0070 0 0 0.0001 0.0073 0.1456 0.8400

.
Our calibration procedure does a good job of replicating key facts in the data that we target.
Figure 18 shows the age-income distribution in the model relative to the data. We impose on the
data that income falls 0.35 log points at retirement, so the retirement numbers are equal to average
income at 60 minus 0.35. The model does a good job of capturing the age-income profile at younger
ages. Figure 19 shows the distribution of idiosyncratic income shocks in the boom relative to the
bust. Our income shocks capture well the left skewness found by Guvenen et al. (2014).
C.2 Calibration Targets and Procedure
Most of the external calibration targets are described in the main text. There are a few details
that we relegate to this appendix. First, although the transition matrix is described in the main
text, we do not detail it there. Letting state 1 be the crisis, state 2 be a recession with loose credit,
state 3 be an expansion with loose credit, state 4 be a recession with tight credit, and state 5 be
an expansion with tight credit, the transition matrix is:
ΞΘ =

0.6364 0 0 0 0.3636
0 0.1011 0.8989 0 0
0.0133 0.1832 0.8035 0 0
0 0 0 0.1011 0.8989
0.0133 0 0.0200 0.1832 0.7835

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Figure 18: Age-Income Profile in Model and Data



















Lifecycle Profile of Average Log Income Rel to Mean
Model
Data
Note: This figure shows the age-income distribution. The x axis is ages from 26 to 70 in our model. The y axis shows average
log income by age, with zero being the average log income in the model. The data come from Guvenen et al. (2016). The
retirement data is equal to the average income at 60 minus 0.35 to be consistent with retirement in our model. The model is
simulated from our model.
Figure 19: Distribution of Idiosyncratic Income Shocks in Boom vs. Bust

















Idiosyncratic Shocks: Boom vs. Bust
Boom
Bust
Note: This figure shows the distribution of idiosyncratic income shocks in the boom and the bust calculated from model
simulations. The results compare favorably to the evidence in Guvenen et al. (2014).
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Table 8: Moments Matched in Calibration Procedure
Moment Data Model
Mean Price 5.00 4.994
Ratio of Net Worth at 60 45 at 10th Percentile Net Worth 3.576 3.472
Ratio of Net Worth at 60 45 at Median Net Worth 2.096 2.094
Cumulative Default Over 8 Year Crisis 8.00% 8.00%
Note: The four moments used in the calibration of a, ψ, ξ, and d̄. The model column indicates the moments in the model and
the data column indicates their values in the data that we use as targets.
In this matrix, the probability listed is the probability of a transition from the row i to the column
j, so that rows add to one. The economy remains in the crisis state with a probability 63.64% of
the time and exits with a probability of 36.36%. The expansion and recession states look identical
for loose and tight credit except that in a tight-credit expansion the probability of remaining is
2% lower. There is a 2% probability the economy transitions to a loose credit expansion. The
economy enters a crisis from an expansion with 1.33% probability. The transition matrices between
expansion and recession are based on NBER dates as described in the main text.
The second detail relegated to the main text is how we reduce aa, the age-dependent valuation
of a house, in old age. We assume that this is constant at its calibrated value until retirement,
at which point it falls by 1/15 of its initial value each year until death, which is 10 years after
retirement. Our results are not sensitive to this specification.
We match four internal calibration targets. To match these four moments, we alter the param-
eters and solve the FRM economy under the baseline monetary policy. The average price is fairly
insensitive to ψ, ξ, and d̄ and can be set using a alone, and we target a house price of five times
the average pre-tax income in the economy. We then alter ψ, ξ, and d̄ to target three moments.
The first two are the ratio of total net worth at age 60 to age 45 in the SCF for the median and
10th percentile households by net worth. To smooth out noise in the SCF for any particular age,
we calculate total net worth at age 60 as the mean total net worth from ages 58 to 62 and total ent
worth at age 45 as the mean total net worth from age 43 to 47. We find a 10th percentile ratio of
3.576 in the SCF and a ratio at the median of 2.096. The final moment is the cumulative default
rate over a eight years in our main impulse response, which we choose to target eight percent. The
four moments are matched quite well, as indicated in Table 8. All four moments are within 0.15%
of their target values.
D Additional Numerical Results (Online Only)
D.1 Downturn Moments for Alternate Monetary Policies
Table 3 in the main text summarizes the performance of the various mortgage designs we consider
under the baseline monetary policy, and Table 6 reports the same statistics this for the short rate
reduction and the short rate reduction with quantitative easing monetary policies. Table 9 reports
the same statistics this for the Volcker monetary policy.
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Table 9: Downturn Moments For Various Mortgage Designs Under Volcker Monetary Policy
Design FRM ARM EK FRMUR Option ARM
Pct Point Reduction in Max ∆P Rel to FRM -2.59 -0.42 0.01 -2.83
Pct Point Reduction in Max ∆C Rel to FRM -0.84 -0.25 0.00 -0.59
Share Defaulting over 8 Years 8.46% 11.62% 9.17% 8.46% 13.27%
Note: Table shows the indicated statistics for each mortgage design averaging across 100 simulations of a crisis that lasts 5.66
years after an expansion with loose credit as described in the main text under the Volcker monetary policy. The top row shows
the percentage point change in the peak to trough change in price relative to FRM, with a positive number indicating a less
severe price decline. The second row shows the percentage point change in the peak to trough change in consumption relative
to FRM, with a positive number indicating a less severe decline in consumption. The third row shows the share of the housing
stock defaulting after 8 years.








































































































ARM Spread Rel to Short Rate
EK Spread  Rel to Short Rate / 10 Yr Bond Rate
FRMUR Spread Rel to 10 Yr Bond Rate
OARM Spread Rel to Short Rate
Note: The figure shows the short rate, 10-year bond rate, and FRM mortgage rates in the left panel and the ARM, FRMUR,
EK, and OARM spreads in the right panel. All interest rates are for pre-paid interest timing.
D.2 Mortgage Spreads and Yield Curves
This section documents the equilibrium yield curves and mortgage spreads in our model.
We consider five main mortgage designs. The FRM has an interest rate that depends on the
aggregate state in which the mortgage is originated. The ARM has a spread over the short rate
that depends on the aggregate state in which the mortgage is originated. The EK mortgage has a
spread over the short rate if it is converted to an ARM or the 10-year bond rate if it is an FRM
based on the aggregate state in which the mortgage is originated. The FRM with an underwater
refinancing option can be written as a spread over the initial 10-year bond rate that is preserved
when the underwater refinancing option is exercised in the crisis state. Finally, the option ARM
has a spread just like the ARM but allows negative amortization up to an LTV defined by the LTV
constraint at origination.
The left panel of Figure 20 shows the short rate, the 10-year bond rate plus 1.65 percent, and
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ARM Spread Rel to Short Rate
EK Spread  Rel to Short Rate / 10 Yr Bond Rate
FRMUR Spread Rel to 10 Yr Bond Rate
OARM Spread Rel to Short Rate
Note: The figure shows the short rate, 10-year bond rate, and FRM mortgage rates in the left panel and the ARM, FRMUR,
EK, and OARM spreads in the right panel. All interest rates are for pre-paid interest timing.
the FRM rate for the baseline calibration. Recall that the calibration is set such that the average
FRM rate is equal to the average 10 year bond rate plus 1.65 percent. There is a positive spread
relative to the 10-year bond in expansions and a negative spread in recessions and crises. This is
because mortgages originated in a recession or crisis tend to be “safer” in terms default probabilities
since prices are expected to recover, which lowers spreads.
The right panel of Figure 20 shows the spreads for the ARM, EK, FRMUR, and OARM. Like the
FRM, the spreads are higher in expansions. This is especially true for the EK and FRMUR, since
in expansions the spread prices in the option to convert to an ARM or refinance when underwater.
Figure 21 shows the same figures for the Volcker monetary policy. One can see that the short
rate now rises in crises and the FRM rate also rises, although not by as much. Because of high
default in the crisis, spreads are higher in the crisis for EK and FRMUR.
Finally, Figure 22 shows the short rate, ARM spread, and FRM rate for the four different
monetary policies we consider: baseline, Volcker, the short rate reduction only, and the short rate
reduction with QE. For the short rate and ARM spread, the short rate only and short rate plus QE
lines overlap. There is a 1.00 percent reduction in the short rate in this state. In the FRM rates,
however, the long rate is subsidized enough so that the difference between the expansion and crisis
risk-free 10-year bond rate is 1.40 percent.
D.3 Lender Cost of Capital Rises in Crisis
This section considers an extension in which the lender cost of capital κ rises in a crisis. The model
easily generalizes to the case in which κt is state-dependent. We keep our baseline calibration (that
is we do not attempt to re-match the internally-calibrated moments) and κ at 125 basis points for
non-crisis states.
Anderson, Duffie, and Song (2019) show that in a model of debt overhang, shareholders of a
bank will require a return on a riskless loan of approximately the credit spread of the bank. In the
62


























































































































































Note: The figure shows the short rate in the first panel, the ARM spreads in the second panel, and the FRM rate in the third
panel for the baseline, Volcker, short rate only, and short rate with quantitative easing policies.
crisis, credit spreads on banks rise about 1.5%. Hence we consider a case in which κ rises by 1.5%
in the crisis state. This is a somewhat extreme case as our crisis lasts 5.7 years while the spike in
credit spreads on banks in the crisis was far more short-lived, but we use this value in the spirit of
an aggressive robustness check.
The results are shown in Tables 10 and 11. A few things are worth noting. First, the price and
default benefits of alternative mortgage designs relative to FRM shrinks from the baseline. This is
the case because the cost of originating a new mortgage in the crisis rises, which reduces demand
by new homebuyers under the alternative mortgage designs. However, the reason why this happens
differentially for ARM and FRM is somewhat subtle. Recall that with the FRM households keep
the interest rate over the life of the loan, while with the ARM, households keep the spread over the
life of the loan, so the increase in κ affects FRM and ARM equally absent a behavioral response by
the borrowers. This occurs due to prepayment behavior. The fixed FRM rate is still low relative to
the other states so there is not an incentive to refinance out of mortgages originated in the crisis.
However, now the spread at which one originates an ARM rises for loans originated in the crisis,
creating an differential incentive to refinance out of a loan originated in the crisis under ARM. This
prepayment risk pushes up spread under ARM relative to FRM, which is what reduces demand by
new homeowners. This effect is what eliminates some of the benefits of ARM and EK for price and
default
In terms of unconditional household welfare, ARM, EK, and FRMUR all look roughly similar
to FRM. Intuitively, the prepayment risk drives up the cost of these mortgages, which eliminates
some of the benefits.
Overall, the results for this aggressive robustness check shows that while our results are quan-
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Table 10: Moments From Downturn Simulations For Various Mortgage Designs With High Crisis
Lender Cost of Capital
Design FRM ARM EK FRMUR Option ARM
Pct Point Reduction in Max ∆P Rel to FRM 1.33 1.06 0.45 1.56
Pct Point Reduction in Max ∆C Rel to FRM 0.85 0.60 0.19 1.20
Share Defaulting over 8 Years 8.50% 6.81% 7.06% 7.81% 7.89%
When Enter Crisis
Note: Table shows the indicated statistics for each mortgage design averaging across 100 simulations of a crisis that lasts 5.66
years after an expansion with loose credit as described in the main text. The top row shows the percentage point change in
the peak-to-trough change in price relative to FRM, with a positive number indicating a less severe price decline. The second
row shows the percentage point change in the peak-to-trough change in consumption relative to FRM, with a positive number
indicating a less severe decline in consumption. The third row shows the share of the housing stock defaulting after 8 years.
Table 11: Moments From Stochastic Simulations For Various Mortgage Designs Relative to FRM
With High Crisis Lender Cost of Capital
Design ARM EK FRMUR Option ARM
Std Dev of Price Rel to FRM 98.0% 98.6% 99.9% 95.7%
St Dev of Default Rate Rel to FRM 80.4% 85.1% 93.0% 80.8%
St Dev of Agg Consumption Rel to FRM 96.4% 98.3% 101.0% 91.5%
Increase in Household Welfare Rel to FRM 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 0.33%
Notes: All series are percentages relative to the same statistic for the indicated FRM model. Price, default, and
aggregate consumption are calculated from aggregate 6,400 year simulations. Idiosyncratic consumption is calculated
by simulating 25,000 individuals each periods for 6,300 years. Household welfare is calculated as the equivalent
variation in terms of the percent increase in annual consumption an agent would require in the FRM economy to be
indifferent between being born in a random period in the indicated economy instead of the FRM economy.
titatively smaller if lenders have a significantly higher cost of capital in crisis states, they are
qualitatively similar.
D.4 Movements In Interest Rates Orthogonal To the State of the Economy
Subsection 5.4 introduced interest rate variation orthogonal to the state of the economy. As a
reminder, to do so we generalize the aggregate state Θt to have 10 values instead of 5. As before,
there is a crisis state with tight credit, a recession state with either tight or loose credit, and an
expansion state with either tight or loose credit. However, all five states may have high or low short
interest rates, with an independent and identically distributed 50 percent probability of being in
the high or low interest rate state. We assume that the interest rates in the high interest rate state
are ∆/2 above our baseline calibration rates, while the interest rates in the low interest rate state
are ∆/2 below our baseline calibration rates. ∆ is thus the difference between interest rates in the
high and low states.
This section shows downturn simulations for these models. Because things look similar for the
∆ = 0.5%, ∆ = 1.0%, and ∆ = 1.5% figures (albeit shifted by different amounts) we show only the
∆ = 1.0% basis points case below.
Figure 23 shows the results. One can see that with variation in interest rates orthogonal to
the state of the economy, the downturn is slightly smaller for both ARM and FRM in terms of
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Figure 23: Movements In Interest Rates Orthogonal to State of the Economy









































































Delta = 1% FRM
Delta = 1% ARM
Cum Diff Delta = 1%









































Note: The figure shows in solid lines the outcomes in a simulated downturn in which the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent
to 80 percent and there is a deep downturn lasting an average of 5.66 years under an FRM and ARM. The dashed lines show
the case with orthogonal rate movement with a 1.0% difference between the high and low interest rate states, with the midpoint
corresponding to our baseline calibration. There is an iid 50 percent chance of being in the high or low state.
prices, default rates, and consumption. In fact, the FRM economy with ∆ = 1.0% orthogonal
rate movement is close to the ARM economy with no orthogonal rate movement. However, the
differences between FRM and ARM are quite similar with and without orthogonal rate movement.
This shows that our main results are robust to allowing for additional variation in interest rates
that does not depend on the state of the economy.
D.5 Crisis Without Tightening LTV Constraint
This appendix compares ARM and FRM in the version of the model in which the LTV constraint
does not tighten to complement Figure 5, which compares the baseline FRM model to an FRM
model without a tightening LTV constraint. One can see that ARMs still deliver higher house
prices, less default, and higher consumption. However, the magnitudes on default and house prices
are much smaller without a significant housing bust.
D.6 FRM With Underwater Refinancing Without Built-In Option
In the main text, we model the FRM with an underwater refinancing option (FRMUR) as an FRM
with a built-in option to lower the FRM rate in a crisis. We do so in order to put the FRMUR
on equal footing with the EK mortgage in the sense that the original lender prices the option to
refinance into the pre-crisis mortgage rate. In this appendix, we show quantitative results for an
alternate specification: an FRM that can be refinanced underwater without an increase in principal
(which we call a “refinancing FRMUR” rather than an “option FRMUR” in the main text). Under
this specification, the additional risk of refinancing the FRM underwater is priced by the new bank
that originates the loan in the crisis rather than by the original lender. We introduce this into our
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Figure 24: ARM vs. FRM With No LTV Tightening









































































































Note: The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion. In this version of the model
the maximum LTV does not drop from 95 percent to 80 percent and instead stays at 80 percent, but the economy does fall
into a deep downturn for an average of 5.66 years. Monetary policy is unchanged from the baseline. The blue line shows FRM,
while the orange line shows ARM.
model by altering the refinancing constraint so that the LTV constraint only has to be satisfied if
the principal balance is being increased.
Figure 25 quantitatively compares the option FRMUR with the refinancing FRMUR. One can
see that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, although the refinancing FRMUR
performs slightly more poorly than the option FRMUR. Indeed, the FRM that requires a refinancing
has a 1.55 percentage point larger decline in prices, has less initial default but more subsequent
default so that over eight years an additional 0.82 percent of homeowners default, and consumption
falls by 0.36 percentage points more. To understand the results, recall that with the option FRMUR,
the option to refinance is priced into the loan ex ante, which drives up the spread in expansion
state. By contrast, with the refinancing FRMUR, borrowers are allowed to refinance underwater
and their default risk is priced by the new lender that originates the refinanced loan in the crisis.
These borrowers are riskier because they have a high LTV, and this drives up the spread in the
crisis state. Relative to the option FRMUR, the gap between interest rates in the expansion and
crisis state shrinks and the amount of relief provided by the FRMUR is lower, leading to a slightly
larger price declines and more default.
E Mortgage Amortization Schedule (Online Only)
In this appendix, we derive the amortization formula that defines the required minimum payment
for a mortgage in our setting with pre-paid interest.
Assume a mortgage is taken out with principal M0 at time 0 and amortizes over T periods at
an interest rate i. Define Pt as the principal payment at time t and It as the interest payment at
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Figure 25: Option FRMUR vs. Refinancing FRMUR
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The figure shows the impulse response to a simulated downturn preceded by an expansion with loose credit under an “option
FRMUR” as in the main text where the initial lender gives the borrower and option to refinance in the crisis and prices it
into the up-front rate and a “refinancing FRMUR” where the subsequent lender charges the underwater refinancing borrower
a higher rate for their default risk. In the downturn, the maximum LTV falls from 95 percent to 80 percent and the economy
falls into a deep downturn for an average of 5.66 years.
time t. Finally, let the constant annual payment be x.
Let us begin with the “standard” or “post-paid” timing whereby the interest between time t
and t− 1 is paid at time t. The principal at time t is then:
Pt = (x− iM0) (1 + i)t−1 .
It also must be that the sum of the mortgage payments is equal to the initial principal plus interest
payments:
Tx = M0 +
T∑
t=1




These two equations can be combined to obtain:
M0 = (x− iM0)
T−1∑
t=0
(1 + t)t ,
which when solved for x yields the standard amortization formula:
x = M0
i (1 + i)T
(1 + i)T − 1
.
We now wish to define a similar formula for the case of prepaid interest whereby the interest
between time t and t+1 is paid at t. To maintain symmetry with the standard formula, we assume
67
that the household takes out a mortgage of size M0 and in period one makes an interest payment





































This is the same amortization formula as is standard replacing i with i/ (1− i) in the recursive
part. This makes sense because pre-paying an interest at rate i at time t is the same as paying a
rate of i/ (1− i) at t+ 1.
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